

# THE COSSACK EXPERIMENT IN *SZLACHTA* DEMOCRACY IN THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH: THE HADIACH (*HADZIACZ*) UNION

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The successful Cossack uprising of 1648 brought in its wake a peasant rebellion in the southeast territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi took advantage of this rebellion to complete the abolition of the *de facto* oligarchy there and to replace it with the rule of the Cossack Army. The present study analyzes this process and the attempts of the Cossack *starshyna* to take part in the *szlachta* democracy which existed in the Commonwealth.

In the Ukrainian palatinates (*województwa*) of Kiev, Bratslav (Braclaw), and Chernihiv (Czernichów), the number of *szlachta* (nobles) was smaller than in the rest of the Commonwealth: the average for the whole country was 8 to 10 percent of the population, rising in some parts of Mazovia to 25 percent, but in the Kiev palatinate the *szlachta* comprised only about 1 percent of the population.<sup>1</sup> There were overwhelming differences in wealth between the majority of the *szlachta* and the handful of magnates who had private armies and held a virtual monopoly on important military and administrative posts. In the Kiev palatinate, for example, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki (Vyshnevets'kyi) had 38,000 households with 230,000 serfs; in Bratslav, Stanisław Koniecpolski owned 18,548 households of the 64,811 for the whole palatinate.<sup>2</sup>

This situation differed from that in Sandomierz, Cracow, Mazovia, and the palatinates of Great Poland. There the growth of latifundia

<sup>1</sup> *Historia Polski*, ed. T. Manteuffel, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Warsaw, 1958), p. 417. According to I.P. Krypiakovich (*Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* [Kiev, 1954], p. 16), there were 215 *szlachta* landowners in the Bratslav palatinate and 400 *szlachta* landowners in the Kiev palatinate. If these numbers are multiplied by 5 (a probable average family), then the percentage of *szlachta* which results is less than 0.5 in Bratslav and less than 1 in Kiev. We do not know the number of landless *szlachta* in those palatinates.

<sup>2</sup> Krypiakovich, *Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 18-19; Z. Wójcik, *Dziki Pola w ogniu* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 140.

was not as rapid and owners of one to five villages had an influence on the local diets (*sejmiki*). For generations the *szlachta* of those lands were accustomed to fighting fiercely for their rights and were suspicious of both the king and the magnates.

As part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (until 1569), the Ukrainian palatinates (Kiev, Bratslav, Chernihiv) did not experience the "execution of law" movement, and neither the economic nor political power of their magnates was ever seriously challenged. Not only the owners of just a few villages, but even some Crown officials who possessed extensive latifundia sought protection from one of these Ukrainian "kinglets." For without such protection, neither life nor property was assured.

In such a situation, the petty nobles of the Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv palatinates, overwhelmingly Orthodox and overshadowed by the magnates, felt closer socially and culturally to the Cossacks. They sided with the Zaporozhian Host that from the end of the sixteenth century was the center of Cossack life. Many nobles served with the Cossacks before 1648, and still more joined Khmel'nyts'kyi at the time of the uprising.<sup>3</sup> The Zaporozhian Host offered the *szlachta* both protection and the chance for enrichment. This development, however, evoked loyalties different from those of the Commonwealth *szlachta*.

Throughout the seventeenth century a hereditary upper stratum, called the *starshyna*, was developing among the Cossacks. Most of its members were Registered Cossacks—that is, those who were on the payroll of the Crown Army. The number of Registered Cossacks was left to the discretion of the Diet (*Sejm*), whose deputies usually voted for increases in the Cossack regiments when they anticipated war and then demanded severe cuts in the Cossack payroll in peacetime. Those who were left out of the register naturally became discontented and would often stir up popular uprisings in the Ukraine. Registered Cossacks (in 1590 their number was around 1000; by 1638, it had risen to 6000) represented only a small fraction of the people who led the "Cossack way of life"; therefore, the Commonwealth had no trouble amassing an army of 20,000 Cossacks in 1617. The Constitution of 1638 explicitly required that all Cossacks *not* registered be treated

<sup>3</sup> The most interesting study on *szlachta* service in the Zaporozhian Host and their participation in the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising is W. Lipiński, "Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Kiev and Cracow, 1912), pp. 157-328. See also W. Tomkiewicz, "O składzie społecznym Kozaczyzny Ukrainnej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku," *Przegląd Historyczny* 37 (1948): 249-260.



as commonfolk, i.e. peasants (*w chłopy obrócone pospólstwo*), and deprived the Registered Cossacks of their autonomy and privileges. Indeed, it was from the time of the constitution's enactment that the *starshyna*, as well as all other Cossack groups, was ready to fight for Cossack rights.

The *starshyna* was not part of the *szlachta* democracy, although some of its members were of noble origin or had been ennobled for service in military campaigns. Nevertheless, through the power and military strength of the Zaporozhian Host, their position in society was similar to that of the *szlachta* in the rest of the Commonwealth. They regarded themselves as noble knights, traced their descent from Jesophat and from the *druzhyna* of the Kievan state, and were sometimes called Cossack Sarmatians.<sup>4</sup>

As self-appointed defenders of the Orthodox faith, the Cossacks found an ally in the Church's powerful hierarchy, whose members were socially close to the *starshyna* and were in the same inferior position to the Catholic hierarchy as the *starshyna* was to the *szlachta*. Because of that inferiority and the oligarchic system prevailing in the Ukrainian palatinates the sense of common Cossack identity and Orthodox faith overrode the social differences between the *starshyna* and ordinary Cossacks, and between the black clergy (monks, from whose ranks the hierarchy was chosen) and the white clergy (parish priests). When the Cossacks' revolt began, nearly the whole society—from noble to peasant—joined in the fight against the common enemies: Wiśniowiecki, Koniecpolski and the oligarchic system through which they exercised power.

The oligarchs' position was based on influence at court, control of local administration, strong private armies, and manipulation of Cossack regiments and leaders. To the Crown and to the Lithuanian nobility they represented themselves as defenders of the eastern frontiers and preservers of *szlachta* dominance over the Cossacks and other

<sup>4</sup> With reference to the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, L. Baranovych wrote in 1671:

“Pożal się Boże nieszczęsnej godziny,  
Że się sarmackie z sobą tłukły syny”

[Grieve O God for the unhappy hour when the Sarmatians' sons were fighting each other]. Citation from R. Łużny, *Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska* (Cracow, 1966), p. 154; S. Velychko, “Skazanie o voine Kozatskoi z Poliakami ...,” in *Ukrains'ka akademiia nauk / Istorychno-filolohichnyi viddil* (Kiev, 1926), p. 1; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 1 (Kiev and L'viv, 1913), p. 144; O. Ohloblyn, *Dumky pro Khmel'nychchynu* (New York, 1957), p. 82.

“lower” elements in the Ukraine. But when faced with Khmel’nyts’kyi’s successful military challenge, the oligarchs found themselves almost completely isolated within the society of the Ukrainian palatinates and dependent on outside support.

Khmel’nyts’kyi’s achievements in 1648 were remarkable: he destroyed the Crown Army in the battle of Korsun’, taking both its hetmans prisoner, and took control of Kiev, Chernihiv, and Bratslav. Yet, even after Pyliavtsi (Pilawce), Khmel’nyts’kyi did not seize L’viv, although at the time the Commonwealth was not only without an army, but also in the midst of internal troubles caused by the death of King Władysław IV and the pending election.

These questions arise: Why did Khmel’nyts’kyi—against the advice of some of his colonels—lose such an opportunity to expand his base of power? Why didn’t he dispatch his troops and those of his Tatar ally to the left side of the San and Vistula? Why, instead, did he show such keen interest in the outcome of the election of the new King?

The answers to these questions may be found in the letters which Khmel’nyts’kyi sent to Władysław IV and Jan Kazimierz.<sup>5</sup> It is significant that Khmel’nyts’kyi did not write to the primate of Poland, who constitutionally acted as *inter rex* during the interregnum, but to the king whom he knew to be deceased. In his letter, the Cossack hetman placed himself under the orders of the king, but not the Commonwealth. Only by addressing the letter in this fashion could Khmel’nyts’kyi undertake a sharp attack both on the oligarchs and on the state administration subordinated to them. In accusing the latter, Khmel’nyts’kyi was simultaneously accusing the Commonwealth which, through the prism of the Ukrainian palatinates, was at the

<sup>5</sup> Khmel’nyts’kyi to Władysław IV, 12 June 1648, in *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmel’nyts’koho*, ed. I. P. Krypiakewych and I. Butych (Kiev, 1961), pp. 33-34; Khmel’nyts’kyi to Jan Kazimierz, 15 November 1648, in *Dokumenty*, p. 80. Contemporaries were aware of Khmel’nyts’kyi’s recognition of royal power and his mistrust of the Commonwealth: see the statement of Adam Kisiel (Kysil’) in the Diet on 10 October 1648 in *Jakuba Michalowskiego księga pamiętnicza* (hereafter *Księga pamiętnicza*) (Cracow, 1864), pp. 237-238. For similar views of other senators see *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 234-235. A contemporary poet wrote that Khmel’nyts’kyi was more afraid of the king than the Commonwealth:

“... więcej  
Bał się Króla z natury chłopskiej narowitej  
Aniż Sejmu wszystkiego Rzeczypospolitej,  
Za czerń ją rozumiejąc i bez głowy ciało.”

S. Twardowski, *Wojna domowa z Kozaki i Tatary...* (Kalisz, 1681), p. 40.



mercy of the all-powerful magnates. He appealed to the king, therefore, as the defender of justice and the Cossack freedoms which were being abolished by the all-powerful oligarchs.

Several months later, Khmel'nyts'kyi went even further. While promising Jan Kazimierz support for his candidacy to the Polish throne, Khmel'nyts'kyi simultaneously urged him to change the political system of the Commonwealth. In effect, the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host wanted the Polish king to become an absolutist ruler.<sup>6</sup>

Khmel'nyts'kyi's suggestions and his promise of support—sincere or not—were of interest to the monarchistic party, headed by the Crown's chancellor, Jerzy Ossoliński, who wanted to strengthen royal power in the Commonwealth.<sup>7</sup> Ossoliński was supporting the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz, who was known to favor a negotiated peace with the Cossacks. The war party, with Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, supported the other Vasa candidate, Karol Ferdynand, bishop of Breslau, who promised merciless war against the Cossacks.<sup>8</sup>

Even after his victory at Pyliavtsi, Khmel'nyts'kyi believed that he could not destroy the Commonwealth and so must negotiate with it. He was convinced that his only chance for coming to an agreement was to deal with Jan Kazimierz and Jerzy Ossoliński. Had he taken L'viv and advanced to the San, no one in the Commonwealth would or could have negotiated with him and the candidacy of Jan Kazimierz would have been strongly endangered. That may be the main reason

<sup>6</sup> *Dokumenty*, p. 80. Support for the idea of a strong monarchy in the Commonwealth was also demonstrated by Khmel'nyts'kyi in later years: *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 374. In the poem on the Khmel'nyts'kyi coat of arms (which prefaced the list of Registered Cossacks offered to Jan Kazimierz after Zboriv [Zborów]) the king's strength is connected with Khmel'nyts'kyi's loyalty to him:

“Niezwyjęzonym Królu w swym chrześcijańskim państwie  
Gdy powolność Chmielnickich majesz w swym poddaństwie.”

St. Oświęcim, *Diariusz 1643-1651*, *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum*, vol. 19 (Cracow, 1907), p. 213; Khmel'nyts'kyi to Jan Kazimierz, 15 August 1649, *Dokumenty*, pp. 122-123.

<sup>7</sup> L. Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński* (L'viv, 1924), pp. 383-385; W. Czaplinski, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warsaw, 1972), pp. 289-290. On the possibility of using Cossacks to increase royal power in the Commonwealth see J. Gierowski, “Rzeczpospolita szlachecka wobec absolutystycznej Europy,” in *Pamiętnik X Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Lublinie: Referaty i dyskusje*, vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1971), p. 116.

<sup>8</sup> W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1936), pp. 1-6; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 8, pt. 2 (Kiev and Vienna, 1922), pp. 105-112; Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński*, pp. 301-328.

why Khmel'nyts'kyi did not take full advantage of his victories in 1648.

With Khmel'nyts'kyi showing signs of clemency and reason, Jan Kazimierz won the election and negotiations were begun. The new king was ready to restore the privileges of the Zaporozhian Host, enlarge the power of its hetman, and make conciliatory gestures toward the Orthodox Church.<sup>9</sup> But neither the king nor Ossoliński could transfer power in the Ukrainian palatinates from the hands of the oligarchs to the Cossack hetman and army. Pressure from the few magnates who had lost estates would not have been strong enough to influence the outcome of negotiations with the Cossacks. But the Commonwealth nobility as a whole could not allow any palatinate to escape from its control into that of the formidable army of the Cossacks, whose leader promised loyalty only to the king. It was not only social greed that stirred masses of *szlachta* to vote for war, but also their fear of drastic social and political changes in the Ukrainian palatinates—changes which could endanger the future of *szlachta* democracy in the Commonwealth.

Khmel'nyts'kyi, meanwhile, was also under pressure from those of his supporters who could lose by an agreement with the king. If such an agreement were reached, many of the rebels would be forced to leave the army and to return to their villages as serfs. Pressure from below for continuation of war, support from part of the nobility, and recognition by the Orthodox hierarchy and several foreign states combined to make a strong impact on Khmel'nyts'kyi: the Cossack leader began to pose not only as the defender of the Cossacks, but also as the creator of Rus'.<sup>10</sup>

It is not quite clear what Rus' meant for Khmel'nyts'kyi or for Kossov, the metropolitan of Kiev. Also unclear is whether the concept of Rus' had any appeal to the ordinary Cossacks or burghers, not to mention the peasants. Lypyns'kyi maintained that without Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolution, Rus' would have disappeared. He argued that in his pursuit of hereditary absolutist power, Khmel'nyts'kyi acted in the best interests of the Ukrainian nation and believed that the hetman imposed on all classes of Rus' society service to the idea of an independent Ukraine.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 371-372; Krypiakewych, *Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 158-160.

<sup>10</sup> *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 374-377.

<sup>11</sup> W. Lipiński, "Stanisław Michał Krzyczewski," pp. 146-148; W. Lipiński, "Dwie chwile z dziejów porewolucyjnej Ukrainy," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 524, 534-540.

Setting aside the rather fruitless point of "best interest," the reader can nurse legitimate doubts as to whether the participation of the peasantry and of many Cossacks in the uprising was in any measure caused by their wish to build an independent Ukraine. It cannot be doubted, however, that the presence of *szlachta* in Khmel'nyts'kyi's camp and his securing of privileges and possessions for them strengthened his efforts at statebuilding. Nor can it be denied that the tradition of Rus' existed mainly and necessarily among the self-conscious groups of society—that is, the nobility, part of the *starshyna* and the black clergy.<sup>12</sup>

The interests of these groups were contrary to the interests of their rebellious peasants and differed from those of the Zaporozhian Host. Both the military dictatorship of the hetman and the autocratic power of the Russian tsar were foreign to their tradition and aspirations. While Khmel'nyts'kyi expressed an interest in strengthening royal power and wanted the Polish king to become an autocrat, the nobility of his state preferred to deal with the Commonwealth. The masses of peasants and thousands of Cossacks opposed any negotiations with Poland-Lithuania, for, we may add, good social reasons. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peace mission of Adam Kysiel (Kysil'), *wojewoda* of Bratslav and subsequently of Kiev, proved unsuccessful and that peace talks were exchanged for military campaigns.

During six years of war, the Commonwealth had been unable to break the Cossacks, but its challenge had grown strong enough for Khmel'nyts'kyi to seek outside help. The hetman placed himself and his state under the protection of the Russian tsar—a step that precipitated a Polish-Russian war in 1654. Deciding that the Cossack uprising was his opportunity to gain control of the Baltic coast, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich ordered Russian armies to launch an attack in the direction of Vilnius (Wilno), Riga, and Elgava (Mittawa). Charles X, who wanted the Commonwealth's Baltic shores for himself, ordered Swedish intervention. Pushed back from the Baltic, the Russians

576-577, 583-586. The everyday meaning of *Rus'* in the seventeenth century was related to the people of the Orthodox faith on the territory of the Commonwealth. At the time of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, his followers were often called *Rus'*. Khmel'nyts'kyi himself did not use slogans about the restoration of Kievan Rus'. For the historical usage of the term, see: O. Pritsak and J. Reshetar, "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," in *The Development of the USSR*, ed. D. Treadgold (Seattle and London, 1964), pp. 255-259.

<sup>12</sup> Pritsak and Reshetar, "The Ukraine," p. 241.



negotiated an armistice with Jan Kazimierz.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, Khmel'nyts'kyi found new allies in the Swedes; with them, as well as with Transylvania and Prussia, he planned the partition of the Commonwealth.<sup>14</sup>

But the Commonwealth did not collapse. The Tatars, Danes, and Austrians joined the war on the Polish-Lithuanian side. Meanwhile, Russia, frustrated by the collapse of the Baltic plans and angered by Khmel'nyts'kyi's pro-Swedish policy, was strengthening its grip on the Cossack domains. Muscovite garrisons were placed in Kiev and other Ukrainian cities. Russian *voevody* were sent there, and the metropolitan of Kiev found himself under pressure to recognize the authority of the patriarch of Moscow. The Russians supported the common people and the white clergy against the Cossack *starshyna* and the Orthodox hierarchy.<sup>15</sup> The social stratification of Khmel'nyts'kyi's supporters, which had existed from the beginning of the uprising, now became more marked, leading to the formation of opposing political groups. The *starshyna* and black clergy, who in the Cossack state played a role similar to that of the nobility in the rest of the Commonwealth, wanted to reopen negotiations with Warsaw. Their opponents preferred to look to autocratic regimes for protection and still recognized the supremacy of the Russian tsar.

When Khmel'nyts'kyi died (27 July 1657), the pro-Commonwealth faction became dominant and it continued to be so under Ivan Vyhov's'kyi. After long negotiations—during which both parties were highly vulnerable, since a great part of the Commonwealth was occupied by Swedish and Russian forces and the Cossacks had to

<sup>13</sup> M. Gawlik, "Projekt unii rosyjsko-polskiej w drugiej połowie XVII w.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 23 (1909): 81, 84-99; Z. Wójcik, "Polska i Rosja wobec wspólnego niebezpieczeństwa szwedzkiego w okresie wojny północnej 1655-1660," in *Polska w okresie drugiej wojny północnej, 1655-1660*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 334-368; G. V. Forsten, "Snosheniia Shvetsii i Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XVII v.," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* 315 (St. Petersburg, 1898): 246-247, and 316 (St. Petersburg, 1898): 322-323.

<sup>14</sup> L. Kubala, *Wojna brandenburska i najazd Rakoczego* (L'viv, 1917), pp. 128-132; Krypiakevych, *Khmel'nyts'kyi*, pp. 515-519.

<sup>15</sup> S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriia Rossii* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 12-13, 21-22; V. O. Einhorn, "O snosheniakh malorossiiskogo dukhovenstva s moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mihailovicha," *Chtenia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh*, 1893, no. 2, pp. 43-46, 51-97; V. Herasymchuk, "Vyhov's'kyi i Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi," in *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* (hereafter *ZNTSh*), 49 (L'viv, 1904): 17-18; V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovniu zhizn'* (Kazan, 1914), pp. 151-161, 178-182; G. Vernadsky, *The Tsardom of Moscow, 1547-1682*, vol. 5, pt. 2 (New Haven and London, 1969), pp. 535-538, 627-645.



battle the Tatars and Russians—the Treaty of Hadiach (Hadziacz) was signed in 1658 and confirmed by the Diet in 1659.<sup>16</sup>

The most important provisions of that treaty transformed the dual Commonwealth into the triple Confederation of the Crown, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Grand Duchy of Rus'—the last to be fashioned from the palatinates of Bratslav, Chernihiv, and Kiev. Like the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the new Duchy of Rus' was to have a separate administration, treasury, army, and judiciary. The *szlachta* of Rus' were to participate in the royal elections together with the *szlachta* of the Crown and Lithuania. Their deputies were to sit in the *Izba* (Commons) and their senators in the Senate. Orthodox bishops from not only the Grand Duchy of Rus', but the Crown and Lithuania were also to sit in the Senate, and the Orthodox religion was granted the same rights as the Catholic. All the offices in the Kiev palatinate were reserved exclusively for the Orthodox. On the territory of the other two *palatinates*, the principle of Catholic-Orthodox rotation was established. Public observance of Orthodox rites was guaranteed throughout the territory of the entire Commonwealth. The rights of Orthodox merchants were safeguarded by the stipulation that their election to city administrations would not be restricted.

The treaty devoted considerable attention to the problem of education. By its terms, the Kiev Mohyla Academy was granted rights equivalent to those of the Cracow Academy, and the creation of yet another such institution was envisaged. Also, the Jesuits were permanently removed from Kiev, and the unhampered development of Orthodox secondary education was guaranteed.

The possibility of ennoblement was provided to many hundreds of Cossacks, and amnesty was granted to those who had participated in the war. In addition to the Zaporozhian Host of 30,000 men, a recruited force of 10,000 to be maintained by public taxes was created. Supreme command over both the Cossacks and the new army was to be exercised by the hetman who, as the *wojewoda* of Kiev, was to be the first senator of the new Grand Duchy. Also, the return of the *szlachta* who had fought against the Cossacks to their estates on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Rus' was made largely conditional on the hetman's approval.

<sup>16</sup> For the text of the treaty of Hadiach, see *Volumina Legum*, 2nd ed., vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1859), pp. 297-300.

The Union of Hadiach—signed on 16 September 1658 and ratified by the Diet on 12 May 1659—resembled the Union of Lublin of 1569. The Polish-Lithuanian union, however, had been achieved under pressure from the Crown and was accompanied by the introduction of political changes which gave the Lithuanian *szlachta* the same social and legal privileges as those of the *szlachta* in Poland. At Hadiach, the situation was markedly different. Here, representatives of the Cossack Army, headed by Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi, devised the idea of a Grand Duchy of Rus' connected with the Commonwealth through participation in its *szlachta* democracy. According to their plan, the *szlachta* of the Rus' Duchy, reinforced by the assimilation of the Cossack *starshyna*, would displace the Cossack Army. Assumption of power by the *szlachta* would be eased because the Cossack uprising had broken the oligarchic control of the Wiśniowiecki, Konięcpolski, and Zasławski families. Entering the Commonwealth system would thus grant the *szlachta* full control of power in Rus' while safeguarding their religious and cultural identity.

The Union of Hadiach emanated from the tradition of *szlachta* democracy and could, it seems, have reinforced religious and linguistic pluralism throughout the Commonwealth. The horizontal ties that connected the *szlachta* of all the provinces were stronger than the divisive forces of differing religions, languages, and ethnic origins that cut through the whole of society. Orthodox, Calvinists, Lutherans, and Catholics were all fully privileged members of the nation. A nobleman from Livonia who spoke German, his equal from Smolensk or Przemyśl (Peremyshl') who signed his name in Cyrillic, and a Polish-speaking nobleman from Cracow or Sandomierz all considered themselves sons of the same Motherland. They called each other "brother," as if needing to constantly remind themselves of their equal rights. The *szlachta*'s worship of liberty and equality, ritualistically observed in public and private life, was accompanied by vigorous condemnation of absolutism and oligarchy. Replete with the phraseology of "freedom" and "equality" were not only the constitutions of the Diet and sessions of the dietines, but school textbooks, anthologies of poetry, sermons, and even speeches at weddings, funerals, and baptisms. The endless repetition of these words in itself signified some lack of their substance in everyday life. And, indeed, what kind of equality could have existed between a Potocki, Zamoyski, or Radziwiłł and a member of the *szlachta* who had no land, education, or office? It was precisely in the court of the magnates, in their private armies and immense

latifundias, that the multitude of *szlachta* sought employment. Yet, the magnates did not succeed in attaining legal distinctions within the framework of the *szlachta* estate, and their mutual rivalry and frequent opposition to the king induced them to seek support among the petty *szlachta*. Moreover, anyone audacious enough to question the vaunted tenets of "freedom" and "equality" would have forfeited the opportunity to play any political role in the Commonwealth.

The enormous differences in wealth that did exist among the *szlachta* did not, then, entail substantial differentiation in privileges or legal position. The fluctuating political and economic power of families and individuals contributed to the preservation of the unity of the entire stratum. Members of the *szlachta* were proud of their descent as members of a free nation. Abroad and sometimes at home they called themselves *equitus Poloniae*, regardless of what language they spoke or whether their home was Cracow, Kiev, or Vilnius. This was a definition of sociopolitical, not ethnic, standing.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, they used this designation interchangeably with the honorific one of "Sarmats."<sup>18</sup> Sarmatian descent was considered yet another tie uni-

<sup>17</sup> A. Zajączkowski, *Główne elementy kultury szlacheckiej w Polsce* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1961), pp. 29-36, 49-56; J. Maciszewski, "W sprawie kultury szlacheckiej," *Przegląd Historyczny* 53 (1962): 539-546; W. Czaplinski, *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej* (Warsaw, 1966), pp. 15-24, 48-56; J. Maciszewski, *Szlachta polska i jej państwo* (Warsaw, 1969); J. Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat* (Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow, and Gdańsk, 1971), pp. 23-43.

<sup>18</sup> Herodotus and later Ptolemy applied the term *Sarmatia* to the territories east of Germany and north of the Black Sea. Some medieval and renaissance scholars described Slavs as descendants of ancient Sarmatians. Heated disputes over the origins of the Slavs and descriptions of Sarmatia led to the popularization of that term. In the sixteenth century the Polish-Lithuanian state was often described as Sarmatia, providing additional bonds between Poles and Lithuanians. After the development of *szlachta* democracy and the joint election of kings, these bonds became particularly important. The *szlachta*, divided by religion, language and historical past, found bases for unity in the Sarmatian myth. According to it, all the nobility of the Commonwealth originated from a Sarmatian tribe which conquered the indigenous population of the East European plains. Sarmatism justified the superior position of the *szlachta*, encouraged its alienation from the rest of society and gave it a strong sense of exclusiveness and unity. A Catholic "Sarmatian" from Poznań or Cracow felt closer to a "Sarmatian" Orthodox from L'viv or Kiev than to his own Catholic, Polish-speaking peasant. The mythology of Sarmatism was composed of many different and often contradictory legends, beliefs, and ideas, changing from generation to generation. Under the partisan pen of rival coteries and political and religious groups, it took various shapes. Megalomaniac, militaristic, xenophobic or pacifist, dressed in renaissance or baroque garb, it served Sarmatian sons of the Commonwealth well from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century. There is no comprehensive monograph on Sarmatism. The best study of its origins was written by T. Ulewicz, *Sarmacja: Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej*



fyng all *szlachta* of the ethnically diverse Commonwealth and separating them from non-Sarmatian society.

The Sarmatians felt infinitely superior not only to the Asiatic peoples suffering under despotism, but also to the French, Bohemian, and Austrian nobility subjected to the absolutism of their rulers.<sup>19</sup> They watched over royal attempts to upset their control of the country with vigilance and great suspicion. Causing them particular uneasiness were the contacts of Władysław IV with Khmel'nyts'kyi and, later, those of Jan Kazimierz, Sobieski, and August II with the Cossacks.

The Hadiach union extended the *szlachta*'s rule to the vast territories long controlled by the Zaporozhian Host. It was for this reason that the Diet agreed to the separation of the three palatinates from the Crown and to the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Rus'. The Crown "lost" three provinces, but the *szlachta* nation regained "brothers" who, meanwhile, had won power in the Zaporozhian Host.

The demands of the Rus' *szlachta* irritated other nobles who were both upset at the ennoblement of numerous Cossacks and offended by the necessity of securing the hetman's consent for their return to estates on the territories of the Grand Duchy. They found the granting of privileges to the Orthodox Church painful and they considered the forced abrogation of the Union of Brest humiliating.<sup>20</sup> We must remember, however, that similar indignation and "fraternal" objections were voiced against the *szlachta* of the Prussian provinces,

*XV i XVI wieku* (Cracow, 1950). See also: Maciej Miechowita, *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis, Asiana et Europiana et de contentis in eis* (Cracow, 1517); T. Mańkowski, *Genealogia Sarmatyzmu* (Warsaw, 1946); S. Cynarski, "Sarmatyzm—Ideologia i styl życia," in *Polska XVII wieku: Państwo-społeczeństwo-kultura*, ed. J. Tazbir (Warsaw, 1969), pp. 220-243; Tazbir, *Rzeczpospolita i świat*, pp. 8-22.

<sup>19</sup> L. Opaliński, "Obrona Polski," in *Wybór pism*, ed. St. Grzeszczuk (Wrocław and Cracow, 1959), pp. 196-203; S. Szymonowicz, "Lutnia rokokowa," in J. Pelc, *Szymonowiciana, Miscellanea Staropolskie*, vol. 10 (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1966), pp. 100; S. Orzechowski, "Mowa do szlachty polskiej przeciw prawom i ustawom Królestwa Polskiego uporządkowanym przez Jakuba Przyłuskiego," in *Wybór pism*, ed. J. Starnowski (Wrocław and Warsaw, Cracow and Gdańsk, 1972), pp. 98-103.

<sup>20</sup> V. Herasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna i Hadjats'kyi traktat," *ZNTSh* 89 (L'viv, 1909): 52-53; W. Lipiński, "Dwie chwile," p. 605; L. Kubala, *Wojny duńskie i pokój oliwski* (L'viv, 1922), pp. 251-252; W. Tomkiewicz, "Unia Hadziacka," *Sprawy Narodowościowe* 11 (1937): 21-23. The Vatican exercised pressure on the court, the Catholic hierarchy, and the Catholic senators to forestall agreement with the Cossacks: *Monumenta Ucrainae Historica*, vol. 11: 1633-1659, supp., ed. J. Slipyj (Rome, 1974), pp. 468-470, 484-486, 520-524.

especially since the latter paid minimal taxes and accepted burgher participation in the local diets.<sup>21</sup>

The *szlachta's* rights and their duty to administer the counties, the provinces, and the country as a whole—gained during the struggle with royal power—were the basis for their pride and self-awareness. Hence it is not surprising that Jerzy Niemirycz (Iurii Nemyrych) appealed to liberty when he spoke in the name of the Zaporozhian Host and Rus' at the Diet of 1659. Nothing but liberty, he declared, attracted them to their common Motherland. Liberty "was our motive and foundation, unbroken by differences in language, in religion—which not only we but our posterity will defend forever, because under liberty, equality will be preserved in its entirety as among brothers."<sup>22</sup>

These words were dear and familiar to all the deputies. They had grown up in a society which was, above all, proud of its liberties, the assertion of which lay at the basis of all Diet constitutions. To achieve their liberties, the *szlachta* had fought a constitutional and, at times, civil war against oligarchy and royal power since the mid-fifteenth century. To a great extent these words represented not only the actual legal position of the *szlachta*, but—more importantly—the Sarmatian ideology.

The *starshyna* and the nobility of the Duchy of Rus'—strong and well established in the army, the church, and the bureaucracy—were reopening negotiations with their equals in the Crown and Lithuania. They did so after destroying the oligarchic system, pacifying a peasant rebellion, and taking control over the Zaporozhian Host.

The *szlachta's* enjoyment of privileges and their devotion to liberty led to the limitation of all central authority in the seventeenth-century Commonwealth, including even that of the Diet. Its deputies were bound by instructions and were often obliged to defer to the opinion of their local diets, which actually controlled state affairs at the county level. The diets not only made decisions on the political and economic life of the country, but exercised considerable influence on its cultural and religious life, as well.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> W. Czaplński, *Dwa sejmy w roku 1652* (Wrocław, 1955), pp. 163-170.

<sup>22</sup> S. Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz, w 300-lecie ugody Hadziackiej* (Paris, 1960), p. 71.

<sup>23</sup> An informative study on the role of the *sejmiki* in the Commonwealth was written by J. Gierowski, *Sejmik Generalny Księstwa Mazowieckiego na tle ustrojowym Mazowsza* (Wrocław, 1948). See also A. Pawiński, *Rządy sejmikowe w Polsce na tle stosunków województw kujawskich* (Warsaw, 1888); S. Śreniowski, *Organizacja sejmiku halic-*

We should remember this role of the local diets when discussing the impact which would have been made on the Commonwealth by the implementation of Hadiach. During the time of the most intense pressure of the Counter-Reformation under Sigismund III, the local diets of the Ruthenian, Volhynian, and other palatinates defended the Orthodox faith, often successfully.<sup>24</sup> After Hadiach, not only these institutions but the whole Duchy of Rus' and the Orthodox bishops sitting in the Senate for the first time would have given strong support to Orthodoxy, slowing down the progress of the Counter-Reformation in the Commonwealth. This, in turn, would also have had an influence on the further development of culture on the territory of the Duchy of Rus'.

The spread of renaissance and baroque culture by way of the Polish language occurred not only throughout the whole territory of the Commonwealth, but also in Muscovy. Polish cultural influences<sup>25</sup> were very strong in the Kiev Mohyla Academy even after the Truce of Andrusovo, which ceded the Left-Bank Ukraine and Kiev to Russia. Before and after Andrusovo, Kiev was the vital cultural center of Orthodoxy, creatively using its contacts with the East and the West, and one of the best—if not *the* best—centers of Orthodox higher education.<sup>26</sup>

While negotiating the Hadiach treaty, the *starshyna* must have realized the risk they were taking in bartering away the position achieved by the Cossack Army. The latter had integrated various social strata and

*kiego* (L'viv, 1938); W. Urban, "Skład społeczny i ideologiczny sejmiku krakowskiego w latach 1572-1606," *Przegląd Historyczny* 3 (1953); W. Dworzaczek, "Skład społeczny wielkopolskiej reprezentacji sejmowej w latach 1572-1655," *Roczniki Historyczne* 23 (1957); W. Hejnosz, "Udział ziemi przemyskiej w życiu parlamentarnym Polski przedrozbiorowej," in *Rocznik Przemyski*, 1961.

<sup>24</sup> P. N. Zhukovich, *Seimovaia bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadnorusskogo dvorianstva s tserkovnoi uniei do 1609 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1901), pp. 239-241, 244-246, 373-374, 422-423, 523-525, 531-533, 536, 582-584; W. Lipiński, "Echa przeszłości," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 125-130; W. Łoziński, *Prawem i lewem*, 2 vols. (Cracow, 1957), 1: 256-258; 2: 80-87.

<sup>25</sup> Here I use the term "Polish culture" to mean that form of renaissance and baroque culture that was prevalent in the multinational and multireligious Commonwealth and was expressed mostly (but not only) in the Polish language.

<sup>26</sup> A. Jabłonowski, *Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska* (Cracow, 1899-1900), pp. 165-173; A. Jabłonowski, "W sprawie Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 14 (1902): 549-586; Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie*, pp. 367-488; Łuźny, *Pisarze kregu*, pp. 105-109; L. R. Lewitter, "Poland, the Ukraine and Russia in the 17th Century," *Slavonic and East European Review* 27 (1948-1949): 164-167, 419-428; A. I. Rogov, "Maciej Strykowski i historiografia ukraińska w XVII wieku," *Slavia Orientalis* 3 (1965): 311-329.



its ranks were swelled by thousands of rebellious peasants. Despite the considerable economic and cultural differences among the army's rank and file,<sup>27</sup> no legal differentiations were involved. By distinguishing himself, any Cossack could enter the ranks of the *starshyna*. In providing for the ennoblement of one hundred Cossacks in each regiment, the Hadiach union would have shattered the previous "legal" equality and unity of interests. The ennobled Cossacks would continue to hold their posts in the army, but they would now be part of the *szlachta* nation. Naturally, however, their identification with the *szlachta* and change in loyalties could not take place automatically. For many new nobles, the victorious Host was the only real center of power and arena of action. To them, the *szlachta* of the Commonwealth represented an unknown and socially alien element.

Nevertheless, the ability of the *starshyna* to join the ranks of the nobility and to participate—on the side of the black clergy—in anticipating and demanding the creation of the Duchy of Rus' cannot be doubted.<sup>28</sup> Ironically, the future of the Duchy of Rus' depended on a severe reduction in the powerful position of the Zaporozhian Host, without whose victories it could not have emerged. Hadiach's legalization of the *de facto* differences that existed among the Cossacks was the most crucial factor in spurring opposition against Vyhovs'kyi. Not peasant masses, but field Cossacks left behind in status by the *starshyna* who had joined the ranks of the *szlachta* were the most vigorous opponents of the union. The negotiators of Hadiach were aware of the potential for hostility among the troops, and it is probably for this reason that they planned to create an army of 10,000 mercenaries responsible to the hetman.

The fact that the initiative for the union came from the Rus' side and that profound changes in social stratification occurred during the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising leads me to challenge the generally accepted thesis that the Hadiach union "came too late."<sup>29</sup> A union

<sup>27</sup> S. Rudnyts'kyi, "Ukrains'ki Kozaky v 1625-30 r.," *ZNTSh* 31-32 (L'viv, 1899), 10-11, 58, 65, 72; M. Slabchenko, "Shche do istorii ustroiu Het'manshchyny XVII-XVIII st.," *ZNTSh* 116 (L'viv, 1913): 72-77; V. A. Miakotin, *Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII vv.*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1924), pp. 29-39, 108-124; L. Okinshevych, "Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo v Ukraini-Het'manshchyni XVII-XVIII st.," *ZNTSh* 151 (Munich, 1948): 13, 154-158.

<sup>28</sup> Pritsak and Reshetar, "The Ukraine," pp. 241-242.

<sup>29</sup> J. Szujski, *Dzieje Polski*, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1895), pp. 463-466; Kubala, *Wojny duńskie*, pp. 251-254; M. Bobrzyński, *Dzieje Polski w zarysie*, 4th ed., 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1927-31), 2: 189; Tomkiewicz, "Unia Hadziacka," p. 1. Philip Longworth does not

based on inclusion of the Rus' ruling stratum in the framework of the Commonwealth nation could have taken place only at a time when social groups had emerged in Rus' that were capable of negotiating with the *szlachta* on an equal footing. It is doubtful whether any act similar to Hadiach could have been proposed until the leading element of the Cossack state had begun to play a role comparable to that of the *szlachta* in the Commonwealth. The argument that Hadiach "came too late" would hold only if its preconditions had existed earlier, but had been ignored. I do not believe this was the case.<sup>30</sup> The *szlachta* could not have agreed to the idea of a Duchy of Rus' before the *starshyna* and Orthodox hierarchy had achieved a position similar to that won by the Crown nobility at the time of the "execution of law" movement. (Of course, the social comparison is much stronger than the political or cultural one.) Otherwise, with similar and equally fallacious logic, it could be argued that the Polish-Lithuanian union of 1569 "came too early"—that is, before the oligarchic structure of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania had been broken.

The terms of the Hadiach union were never carried out. At the time of its ratification Swedish forces were occupying Elbląg and Malbork. Russian troops held Kiev as well as Vilnius, and the unpaid soldiers of the Crown Army were refusing to fight. In the spring of 1659, the Swedes took Tczew, cutting lines of communication with Gdańsk, and blocked the mouth of the Vistula. In such a situation, the same Diet which had ratified Hadiach also decided upon taxation which would satisfy the army's demands. Some troops were sent to help Vyhovs'kyi but the main forces of the Crown and Lithuania were used against Sweden. In June 1659, Vyhovs'kyi, won a brilliant victory at Konotop but failed to seize Kiev. Polish aid did not come, and given the persistence of the Russian military presence in Kiev, the opponents of Vyhovs'kyi managed to overthrow him and to bestow the hetmancy on Iurii Khmel'nyts'kyi.

interpret Hadiach but nevertheless follows the "too late" approach. One can wonder if the revolts of Nalyvaiko or Pavliuk were also "too late" or maybe "too early." See P. Longworth, *The Cossacks* (New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, 1970), p. 122.

<sup>30</sup> For some Polish historians "too late" meant too late to safeguard the powerful position of Poland in Eastern Europe. A. Jabłonowski, *Historia Rusi południowej do upadku Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Cracow, 1912), pp. 259-260; O. Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization* (New York, 1952), p. 209; Kot, *Jerzy Niemirycz*, p. 7; W. Wielhorski, "Ziemie Ukrainne Rzeczypospolitej: Zarys dziejów," in *Pamiętnik Kijowski*, vol. 1 (London, 1959), pp. 55-59.

The fall of Vyhovs'kyi demonstrated the power of political concepts different from those proposed by the black clergy and a segment of the *starshyna*. To the *szlachta* of the Commonwealth, the event also proved the weakness of their Rus' partners. For that reason, given the existing situation, the leaders of the Commonwealth returned to their former, traditional policy toward the Cossacks: dispensing privileges in wartime, attempting enserfment when military crises had passed. For the time being, the Cossacks were granted a number of privileges but the idea of a grand duchy of Rus' was abandoned. In 1660 the Crown hetmans Stanisław Potocki and Jerzy Lubomirski won a decisive victory over the Russians at Chudniv; yet, the Union of Hadiach was not reactivated, despite the demands of the Cossack *starshyna* who again joined the king's side.<sup>31</sup>

From that time on, even the *szlachta* of the Kiev palatinate became increasingly hostile to the tradition of Hadiach. At the end of the seventeenth century, the *szlachta* accused one of the Cossack leaders, Semen Palii, whom they termed "dux malorum et scelerum artifex," of planning to bring the idea of Hadiach to life again.<sup>32</sup>

It should be pointed out that the *szlachta* reacted so strongly to Palii because he successfully challenged the Commonwealth's authority in the Right-Bank Ukraine and had strong support from the masses of the population. His social policies and the support he received from the peasants were dangerous both to the *starshyna* of the Left-Bank Ukraine and to the *szlachta* of the Right Bank.<sup>33</sup> To the latter, Palii was additionally dangerous because of his contacts with the king. The protection given by Jan Sobieski and Augustus II to the Cossack military leaders in the Bratslav and Kiev palatinates was always sensed by the *szlachta* as threatening to their dominant position.

<sup>31</sup> Iu. Khmel'nyts'kyi to Jan Kazimierz, 15 November 1660, in *Pamiętniki wydane wremennoiu komissieiu dlia rozboru drevnikh aktov* (Kiev, 1859), p. 19; Jabłonowski, *Historia Rusi*, p. 262; M. Hrushevs'kyi, *Illustrovana istoriia Ukrainy* (St. Petersburg, 1912), p. 332; Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola*, p. 220.

<sup>32</sup> Instruction for the deputies to the Diet given by the *szlachta* of the Kiev palatinate in 1692, in *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii* (hereafter *AIZR*), pt. 2, vol. 2, (Kiev, 1888), p. 497.

<sup>33</sup> H. I. Serhienko, "Semen Palii," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1960, no. 1, p. 61; J. Janczak, "Powstanie Paleja," in *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Historia 3*, ser. A, vol. 23 (Wrocław, 1960), pp. 94-96, 132-133; B. Kentschynskyj, *Mazepa* (Stockholm, 1962), pp. 217-218; J. Perdenia, *Stanowisko Rzeczypospolitej szlacheckiej wobec sprawy Ukrainy na przełomie XVII-XVIII w.* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1963), pp. 64-66, 82, 106.



In late 1699, after the Turkish war, the Diet abolished the Cossack Army in the Commonwealth.<sup>34</sup>

To recapitulate, while the *szlachta* was becoming hostile toward the Hadiach tradition the Cossack *starshyna* was finding it more and more congenial. In the territories that became part of Muscovy after 1667, the *starshyna* exploited the serf labor of the peasants and eventually entered the ranks of the *dvorianstvo* (nobility). But they lacked those political rights which they could have enjoyed in the Commonwealth. The Russians who dominated these territories were constantly diminishing the rights and privileges of the Cossacks while Russian military garrisons in Kiev and other cities were reducing Cossack autonomy. The "free" election of hetmans was now held under pressure from the tsar's representatives. Of course, the Cossack Army continued to play an important political role—especially under Mazepa—and the Kiev Mohyla Academy flourished. But the *starshyna* could only dream of having the degree of control over their territories which Hadiach would have provided.

Interest in Hadiach disappeared with the decline of the Commonwealth, the liquidation of the Zaporozhian Host, and the subsequent partitions. It revived, however, when modern nationalism was born. For the Poles it then became a useful example of their tolerance and ability to provide broad autonomy for a non-Polish population. For the Ukrainians it symbolized the renunciation of their independence. Hence, historical interpretations of this distant act of 1658-59 vary considerably. Some Polish historians have viewed it as the product of the famous Polish tolerance and political foresight, and have attributed its failure to the political immaturity of the Cossacks.<sup>35</sup> Some Ukrainian historians, on the other hand, have accused Vyhovs'kyi and the *starshyna* of being traitors to the Ukrainian nation.<sup>36</sup> Neither side has indicated what meaning, if any, these terms had in the seventeenth century, while both have equated the Commonwealth with ethnic Poland and Rus' with the Ukraine.

Hadiach illuminates the weaknesses and the strengths of *szlachta* democracy in its multicultural form. The chance for an extension and strengthening of the Commonwealth came at a moment when great

<sup>34</sup> *Volumina Legum*, 2nd ed., vol. 6 (St. Petersburg, 1860), p. 34.

<sup>35</sup> W. Konopczyński, *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej*, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1936), pp. 38-39; W. Tomkiewicz, "Ukraina między Wschodem a Zachodem," *Sprawy Narodowościowe* 12 (1938): 40-41.

<sup>36</sup> W. Lipiński, "Na przełomie," in *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, pp. 586-587, 608, 611, 615-617.

sociopolitical changes were taking place on the territories controlled by the Zaporozhian Host. Concurrently, centralized power was becoming stronger in many European countries—including Russia, which strove to dominate the Ukraine after the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654.<sup>37</sup>

In its struggle against the Khmel'nyts'kyi state, Russia, Sweden, and Transylvania, the *szlachta* democracy was able to mobilize enough strength to defend its independence. But it was unable to support the newly-organized Grand Duchy of Rus'. There, in the welter of domestic rivalries for power and serious social strife, an exterior factor—Russia—proved decisive. It should be emphasized, however, that it was the Rus' side that demanded the organization of the Grand Duchy of Rus'. Its authors and supporters were connected strongly enough with the political and cultural values of *szlachta* democracy to bid for union with the Crown and Lithuania. They tried to introduce and exercise those values in territories previously under a *de facto* oligarchy and later under the centralized dictatorship of the Cossack Army and its hetman. But they did not have the time to practice and shape to their own purposes the values that had come into existence, in life and mythology, on Crown territories at least one hundred years earlier. These men cannot be considered traitors to the Ukrainian nation unless we accept the theory that the peasants of the seventeenth-century Kiev palatinate were nationally conscious Ukrainians. What is certain is that they were defenders *par excellence* of their own historical heritage and culture, and that they wanted to become part of a state built on the political and social principles they cherished and found useful.

The nobility of the Khmel'nyts'kyi state, the Cossack *starshyna*, and the higher clergy—promoters and defenders of the Union of Hadiach and the idea of the Grand Duchy of Rus'—succeeded in achieving control over the Ukrainian *palatinates* and convincing the Commonwealth of the need to create a Grand Duchy of Rus'. But they did not succeed in mustering enough support within their own society to defeat the Russian armies. They also never won whole-hearted backing from the *szlachta* of the Crown and Lithuania. The *szlachta* of the Commonwealth proved foresighted enough to accept the Union of Hadiach but were quick to abandon it when their Rus' "brothers" lost control over the Grand Duchy.<sup>38</sup> When, after the fall

<sup>37</sup> J. Gierowski, "L'Europe Centrale au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle et ses principales tendances politiques," in *XIII<sup>e</sup> Congrès International des Sciences Historiques* (Moscow, 1970), p. 9.

<sup>38</sup> The local diets favored the abolition of the Hadiach union: see Instruction for a Deputy to the Diet from the Principalities of Zator and Oświęcim, 28 March 1661, in

of Vyhovs'kyi, the *szlachta* of the Commonwealth were once again confronted with the hostile Cossack Army, they traded the new idea of union for the old, unsuccessful, but familiar policy of *status quo ante Hadiach*.

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*Akta sejmikowe województwa krakowskiego 1661-1673*, ed. A. Przyboś, vol. 3 (Wrocław and Cracow, 1959), p. 8; Instruction for Deputies to the Diet from Halich County, 21 May 1661, "Lauda sejmików halickich, 1575-1695," ed. A. Prochaska, in *Akta grodzkie i ziemskie*, vol. 24 (L'viv, 1931), pp. 176; Instruction for Deputies to the Diet from Dobryń County, 28 March 1661, "Lauda sejmików ziemi dobrzyńskiej," ed. F. Kluczycki, in *Acta Historia Res Gestas Poloniae Illustrantia*, vol. 10 (Cracow, 1887), p. 7; Instruction for Deputies to the Diet from the Volhynian Palatinate, 28 March 1661, in *AIZR*, pt. 2, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1888), pp. 90-91. Only the *szlachta* from Kiev expressed sympathy for the idea of Hadiach, but even they agreed to the abolition of the Duchy of Rus': 28 March 1661, in *AIZR*, pt. 2, vol. 2 (Kiev, 1888), pp. 110-111.