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Neo-Serfdom in Poland-Lithuania

The purpose of the present article is neither to examine in detail the state of research regarding demesne-robot farming and the "neo-serfdom" or "second serfdom" in Poland-Lithuania nor to attempt a definitive explanation of these phenomena. Rather, the author has set out to show the inadequacy of conventional views by reiterating a series of important points already raised by various Polish historians.

Before elaborating, it is worth mentioning some of the problems around which research and discussion in Polish historiography have centered.¹ Roman Grodecki and Kazimierz Tymieniecki have done much to clarify the legal position of the medieval Polish peasantry, at the same time advancing opposing ideas about the origin of demesne farming.² Jan Rutkowski pointed out the widespread application of demesne farming in Eastern Europe, described changing economic conditions in the countryside during the period dominated by robot (corvée) labor, and originated theories about the negative effect of robot labor on trade and industry. He also investigated the Vistula grain trade, which is often seen as the *spiritus movens* in the creation and development of Polish demesne farming.³ This trade, one of the most studied phenomena of the neo-serfdom period, is a field in which Marian Małowist and his school

1. It would be impossible, even in abbreviated form, to cover here the hundreds if not thousands of Polish articles and monographs concerning neo-serfdom. One might point out, however, that contemporary Polish historiography in this area is characterized by vigorous disputes, based on painstaking monographic work, over problems that survey works treat as long-solved and settled. For a review of the contemporary Polish historiography consult Antoni Mączak, "Polnische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Agrargeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts (1945-1957)," in *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 1 (1958): 33-57; Ezhi Topol'sky [Jerzy Topolski], "Issledovaniia po agrarnoi istorii v narodnoi Pol'she," in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoi istorii Vostochnoi Evropy 1959 g.* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 408-38; V. V. Doroshenko, "'Model' agrarnogo stroia Rechi Pospolitoi XVI-XVIII vv.," in *Ezhegodnik . . . 1965 g.* (Moscow, 1970), pp. 114-29; Stefan Inglot, "Rozwój badań nad historią chłopów polskich," in Stefan Inglot, ed., *Historia chłopów polskich*, vol. 1 (hereafter cited as *HCP*) (Częstochowa, 1970), pp. 7-33.

2. Roman Grodecki, *Początki gospodarki folwarcznej w Polsce: Studia z dziejów kultury Polskiej* (Warsaw, 1949); Kazimierz Tymieniecki, *Historia chłopów polskich*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1965-69), vol. 3: *Geneza zastrzonego poddaństwa chłopów*.

3. See the following works by Jan Rutkowski: *Historia gospodarcza Polski (do 1864 r.)* (Warsaw, 1953; 1st ed., 1923), pp. 85-220; *Poddaństwo włościan w XVIII wieku w Polsce i niektórych innych krajach Europy* (Poznań, 1921); "Przebudowa wsi w Polsce po wojnach z połowy XVII wieku," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lwów), 30 (1916): 309-42.

Partial objection to this picture can immediately be proposed. The main basis for generalizations about demesne-robot farming has been sources concerning crown estates, supplemented by records from church and magnate estates. This is not encouraging, given the fact that 80 percent of arable land was owned by small and middle gentry, who did not, as a rule, leave financial records. We have little information about their methods of administration, their relations with their villages, the relation of *robot* to hired labor, the organization of the sale of their grain, or details of their incomes and expenditures.¹¹

We do know, however, that the position of a crown peasant was quite different from that of a peasant on private land. A private owner had strong interests in the long-term economic welfare of his estate,¹² whereas the profits and responsibilities of a crown overlord ended with his brief term of tenure. Especially in cases of short-term leases, a crown lord would try to squeeze as much profit as he could from an estate without considering any undesirable consequences which might appear after his departure. Sometimes this led to the complete demolition of whole crown latifundia, to the devastation of forested lands, and to the collapse of peasant farms. It took only a few years for Jerzy Wandalin Mniszech—in Sanok *starostwo*—to “lose,” in four villages, 88 peasant households from the total number of 113.¹³

Another great inadequacy of the conventional picture of neo-serfdom is its failure to explain existing regional differences. We do know that rent obligations and money exchange persisted in one area, demesne-robot farming dominated in others, and in some regions (such as the vast territories of the Grand Principality of Lithuania) there prevailed a form of serfdom involving all the usual restrictions and obligations, including some *robot* labor, but *not* involving a developed system of demesne farming. Although regional differences have received scholarly attention, a tendency persists to treat them as minor flaws in the fundamental homogeneity of Poland-Lithuania.¹⁴

11. Wyczański, *Wieś*, pp. 6–9. Ćwiek, *Z dziejów wsi koronnej*, has pointed out that although crown villages have been studied more thoroughly than those privately owned, most of these studies are limited to one complex of demesnes, so that generalizations made on this basis for the entire country should be questioned (pp. 5–9).

12. Anzelm Gostomski, *wojewoda* of Rawa, owner of twenty-eight villages and the author of a well-known book on the organization of demesne farming (*Gospodarstwo*, first published in 1588; see note 9), advised landowners to take care of their peasants and to try to enrich them: “Robota kmiotków, to dochod albo intrata największa w Polsce wszędy, którą robotę gospodarz tak ma szafować, coby kmiotków nie zubożył, a ku większemu pożytku co rok przywodził; bo to może po społu stać u pilnego a po-bożnego gospodarza” (pp. 19–20).

13. Ćwiek, *Z dziejów wsi koronnej*, pp. 56, 49–55, 77.

14. Although historians are more and more aware of the importance of regional differences (e.g., Leonid Żytkowicz, “Okres gospodarki folwarczno-pańszczyźnianej, XVI–XVIII w.,” in *HCP*, pp. 286–90), only the late Ćwiek dared to question the validity of

Actually, the Commonwealth contained a wide range of different legal, social, and economic conditions. In the period from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century several economic regions can be discerned within the vast territory of the Polish Commonwealth—regions which either differed decidedly from the rest of the country or were undergoing similar economic processes at different times. A fully developed rent system (in Crown Prussia) adjoined demesne-robot farms in the Vistula basin, which, in turn, bordered not only on areas of active colonization (the Halicz district, Podolia, the Ukraine) but also on territories which were dominated by a rent system in which the payments were made less in money than in kind (large areas of the Grand Principality of Lithuania, the Carpathian region of Pogórze). Different stages of economic development created differences in the legal position of the rural population and in the economic orientation of the landowners. While in the Vistula basin in the first half of the seventeenth century the average amount of robot labor for a holder of sixteen hectares was five days a week with the use of his livestock, at the same time in the Ukraine big landowners settled many new villages giving the peasants freedom from all obligations for up to twenty years.

In the course of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, and then also in the eighteenth century, we observe the expansion of areas with market-oriented demesne-robot farms. The demesne-robot system, however, never gained complete control of the entire territory of the Commonwealth, and its level of development ranged from areas with the "Dutch" model of rich peasants, strong cities, and hired labor to those where long distances from market outlets and adverse natural conditions (such as infertile soil or forests) made the organization of grain-producing, market-oriented demesne-robot farms not a profitable venture. Furthermore, even in the regions dominated by the demesne-robot system, considerable differences in obligations and the legal position of peasants in neighboring villages often continued to exist. Differences can also be noted in the profit margins for seemingly "similar" demesne-robot farms.

On crown lands in Great and Little Poland, settlement under German law, and even—in the West—German colonization, had been going on as late as the thirteenth century. Many village charters survive from this time, but robot labor is almost never mentioned in them. Already in the next century, however, ten to twenty days of robot labor per year was commonplace, as land fell into the hands of the gentry and royal interference was destroyed. In the villages settled under charter the so-called *sóttys* demesnes developed, the vil-

prevailing opinions and called for research on mass statistical material. Ćwiek argued that although nearly any thesis can be supported by specific examples, the antithesis can also be proved by examples.

lage mayor or *soltys* receiving around forty-eight hectares of land, about the same amount as average gentry demesnes of later times. The lands of the *soltys* demesne were tilled by peasants with little or no land of their own, in return for wages, use of land, or other benefits. The buying out of *soltysy* by the village owners (decreed by the Warecki statute of 1423) and the formation of demesne farms under the owners' direct control followed during the fifteenth century, especially in the neighborhood of large towns and on the banks of navigable rivers, above all the Vistula.

Whereas Little Poland quickly adopted demesne farming, the Gdańsk region continued to contain large peasant farms. In addition to villages with German law charters, there were also Dutch villages near Gdańsk which enjoyed great privileges but paid high rents. Hired labor predominated on both demesne and peasant lands. Over these territories, despite many decrees to the contrary, there wandered numbers of migrant workers.

In the Grand Principality of Lithuania during the 1550s, Sigismund Augustus introduced reforms similar to those that took place in Poland in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. The population of Lithuania at this time was more dependent on the government than was true in Poland; hereditary estates and charters of immunity had developed only in the fifteenth century. On his own property, which formed almost a third of the country, Sigismund Augustus undertook to establish villages, distribute land, set rents, and sometimes institute demesne farms. It is disputed whether the grand prince was the first to initiate such measures or whether he followed the magnates' lead. The fact remains that an economic situation resulted which was closer to Little Poland's in the fifteenth century than in the sixteenth.¹⁵

The huge territories of the Ukraine, incorporated by the crown in 1569, varied greatly, including such different centers as Kiev, Braclaw, Volyn, and Podlasie. Great estates predominated, plenty of land was available, and colonization organized by great landowners continued throughout the period.¹⁶ Grain, cattle, wax, honey, and potash abounded. Independent colonization,

15. For often conflicting views on this subject see D. L. Pokhylevych, *Krest'iane Belorussii i Litvy v XVI-XVIII vv.* (Lviv, 1957); V. I. Picheta, *Agrarnaia reforma Sigizmunda Avgusta v Litovsko-Russkom gosudarstve* (Moscow, 1958); Jerzy Ochmański, "La grande réforme agraire en Lithuanie et en Ruthénie Blanche au XVI^e siècle," *Ergon* (Warsaw), 2 (1960): 327-42; Karl von Loewe, "Commerce and Agriculture in Lithuania, 1400-1600," *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 26, no. 1 (1973): 23-35.

16. Iu. M. Grossman, "Razvitie fol'varochnogo proizvodstva v Russkom i Belzskom voevodstvakh vo vtoroi polovine XVI-pervoi polovine XVII v.," in *Eshegodnik . . . 1965 g.*, pp. 71-79; Maurycy Horn, *Skutki ekonomiczne najazdów tatarskich z lat 1605-1633 na Ruś Czerwoną* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Kraków, 1964), pp. 164-66; Ivan Kryp'iakevych, *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi* (Kiev, 1954), pp. 13-57; Władysław Serczyk, *Gospodarstwo magnackie w województwie podolskim w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Kraków, 1965), pp. 19-29.

threatened by both Tatar raids and new lords, sought protection among the Cossacks. However, we know almost nothing about the organization of demesnes on this land in the sixteenth century.

Territorial differences aside, one may question the idea that gentry rule in Poland-Lithuania was responsible for establishing and maintaining demesne-robot farming where it did exist. Some scholars simply point to the coincidence of the rise of neo-serfdom and the existence of a weak central government, such as the gentry republic.¹⁷ The impression is given that one social group—the gentry—imposed its own system to the detriment of the rest of society. Imposed by the gentry, neo-serfdom overwhelmed the economy, brought about the fall of towns, extended the life of feudalism, delayed the growth of capitalism, and thus lies at the root of Poland's weakness in the eighteenth century.¹⁸

At the same time, the existence of neo-serfdom under the strong monarchical rule of Russia is often ignored, and the absence of neo-serfdom in such aristocratic republics as Venice and Dubrovnik arouses no comment. Moreover, treatment of the gentry as a single group united by identical interests is highly dubious. Great estates, not the gentry, were the first to adopt rent in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; likewise they led the way in establishing demesne farming, and eventually—in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—in again replacing robot labor by rent. It was this last change, supported by government decrees, which led to the ruin of a great number of small gentry estates in the nineteenth century.

It is true that in the East European gentry democracies the gentry had gained full control over the forms and amounts of taxation owed to the state. In Poland-Lithuania all landowners had to pay taxes, and for peasants on gentry estates the state in all its functions was represented by their lord. These facts alone, however, do nothing to explain the growth, establishment, and long life of neo-serfdom or demesne-robot farming. A peasant's position depended less on whether he inhabited a royal, church, or private estate than on the economic conditions prevailing in the region where he lived. Gentry estates in Crown Prussia or the Carpathian highlands were rarely based on the demesne-robot system. In other areas, the system developed, lasted for a while, then disappeared. There are also cases, particularly after military dev-

17. Rutkowski, *Historia gospodarcza Polski*, pp. 275–77; Zientara, "Z zagadnień spornych," pp. 20–21, 40–41, 45–46.

18. Roman Rybarski, *Handel i polityka handlowa Polski w XVI stuleciu*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1958), 1:315–51; Witold Kula, *Teoria ekonomiczna ustroju feudalnego: Próba modelu* (Warsaw, 1962), pp. 149–50; Żytkowicz, "Okres gospodarki folwarczno-pańszczyźnianej," pp. 258–59.

astations, in which the peasantry was coerced into paying money rent in place of *robot* labor.¹⁹

Of course, the effect of noneconomic factors on rural economic life is clearly important and has long been a subject of discussion, but it is hard to come by even the most approximate statistics. For example, it is easy to enumerate the cases of abandonment of fields in the mid-seventeenth century, but it is very hard to determine to what extent these phenomena are related to the enormous military devastations and extended periods of war and to what extent they reflect decay in the demesne-*robot* economy. Anyhow, it seems too risky to draw a direct connection between the abandonment of fields and depopulation. Rather, one can argue that war devastation dramatically speeded the stratification of villages and brought a significant increase in the landless population. Tax collectors obviously would notice and record only those of the *kmiecie* (peasants who had one *tan*—around sixteen hectares—or one-half of a *tan*) who were not hopelessly ruined and who might pay their dues at least in the near future. The number of these *kmiecie* drastically decreased after the 1648–1660 wars, but I would suggest that this decrease corresponded rather to a dramatic increase in the landless population than to actual depopulation (due to the plague, war deaths, or running away).

A conviction on the part of historians that the harmful demesne-*robot* system should not have lasted so long has led to the suggestion that foreign powers were responsible for keeping it alive. The Dutch, with their involvement in the grain trade, were seen to profit the most from the demesne-*robot* system, and therefore were “accused” of having kept it alive by economic and political means.²⁰ Such hypotheses may be questioned on the grounds of insufficient evidence, oversimplification, or inconsistency. A more annoying fault is their generality, their failure to suggest or consider mechanisms whereby mundane reality might have played a leading role. Our lack of sources regarding small and middle gentry estates can to some extent be compensated by the study of these estates in later periods, as well as by existing deeds of purchase and sale, by occasional contemporary descriptions, and, of course, by records from the courts. Although the situation regarding the peasantry is far worse, even here we know enough to ask questions suggesting the inadequacy of general theories propounded up to now. It will be worth our while, then, to touch on some of what *is* known about rural economic organization.

19. Mączak, *Gospodarstwo chłopskie*, p. 341; Ćwiek, *Z dziejów wsi koronnej*, p. 163; Trzyna, “Wtórne poddaństwo,” pp. 389–93.

20. Zientara, “Z zagadnień spornych,” pp. 11, 25, 45–46. Kazimierz Tymieniecki regarded East Central Europe as semicolonial. See his “W sprawie powstania zastrzonego poddaństwa w Polsce i Europie Środkowej,” *Roczniki Historyczne*, 24 (1958): 326–28.

The conviction is deeply rooted in historiography that massive adoption of demesne-robot farming resulted from Poland's gaining control of the mouth of the Vistula in 1466 and from the facilitation of access to western buyers.²¹ Wyczański has been the most recent to call this assumption into serious doubt. Without in any way deprecating the economic importance of the Vistula grain trade, he has pointed out that in Great and Little Poland around 75 percent of the land lay in the hands of the middle gentry, who lived in the countryside and had always needed a demesne to satisfy the needs of their own households and servitors. The price revolution of the sixteenth century which favored grain production could not significantly increase on these territories the area of existing demesnes, since the middle gentry generally possessed very little land not already under cultivation. The growth of demesne farming for internal and external markets took place not on such middle estates but on the great properties of the king, church, and magnates. Although the average gentry demesne was limited to one village, and two demesnes in one village were not uncommon, a demesne on a great estate usually comprised between three and seven villages. The average area of a small to middle gentry demesne was forty-eight to sixty hectares, whereas on the great estates it was three to six times larger.²²

Sixteen hectares of demesne land yielded its owner about forty-eight złoty per year, while the same area leased to a peasant brought in a rent of about two and a half złoty, along with a negligible return in kind. This meant that the demesne brought in 90 percent of a gentry owner's return from his land, and about 80 percent in the case of a large estate. But despite the huge difference between rent and demesne returns, we find only sporadic cases in which peasants were evicted to make room for a demesne. The peasant was in fact responsible for the high return on demesne land through his labor in tilling, harvesting, threshing, transporting, and sometimes even selling the grain, as well as guarding the land and harvests. The urgency of reaping and the long hours involved in threshing often required the manor to engage hired hands in addition to its own peasants. Free labor could be assured only by the existence on each gentry estate of self-sufficient peasants well enough off to be able to work the demesne and still live off their own land.²³

21. Trzyna, "Wtórne poddaństwo," p. 309; von Loewe, "Commerce and Agriculture," pp. 34-35; Rutkowski believed that market availability for agricultural products drove the nobility in the direction of a demesne-robot economy, all the more so since the existing dependence of peasants facilitated this form of production (Rutkowski, *Historia gospodarcza Polski*, pp. 91-95).

22. Wyczański, *Wieś*, pp. 73-76, 82-83.

23. Wyczański, *Studia nad gospodarką starostwa korczyńskiego*, p. 218; Alicja Falniowska-Gradowska, *Świadczenia poddanych na rzecz dworu w królewskich województwach krakowskiego w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Kraków, 1964), pp. 99-100.

and a peasant farm of thirty-two to sixty hectares, receiving no *robot* labor, correspondingly would have needed more.³²

Occasional references in the sources do confirm the existence of a landless population who hired themselves out in unknown numbers to manors and rich peasants, seeking employment in the towns and wandering with the seasons over the lands of Crown Prussia looking for a market for their labor.³³ Such people, having worked the fields for years, would certainly have possessed the qualifications necessary to become *zagrodnicy* in the villages, yet despite the existence of unused arable land during the entire period under discussion, these hired hands did not settle down on it. Unused land existed in many villages containing a few sixteen-hectare farms and a complement of *zagrodnicy*, but no one either could or would undertake to farm it and fulfill the obligations it entailed, even in crown territories where labor was seldom in short supply and even in regions where the lords demanded little *robot* labor.

Such a situation raises questions about the nature of village stratification. How fluid were social distinctions? Did a *kmieć* whose holdings were destroyed by war become a *zagrodnik*, or did he keep his status and have to rebuild his farm? Could the industrious labor of a *zagrodnik* raise him to the status of a *kmieć*, or could he only increase his lands but not alter his status? Did the sons of a wealthy *kmieć* divide his land and become *zagrodnicy*, or did they use inherited capital to seek other professions or acquire sixteen-hectare farms of their own? Was one's status in the village in fact dependent on the amount of land one cultivated, or did it become a hereditary class distinction? *Robot* obligations and serfdom did not really apply to the landless poor whose economic position was far worse than that of the *kmiecie*. Did the richer peasants not find it possible to exploit these poor through wage labor even more effectively than they themselves were exploited through the *robot* system?

The impression which emerges from examining the rural economy is

32. Wyczański, *Wieś*, p. 101.

33. The existence of a vagrant population (*ludzie luźni*) who escaped personal serfdom, during the entire period of the demesne-*robot* economy (suggesting direct and considerable interdependence between serfdom and the use of land), brings into focus questions concerning the reasons for the existence of unoccupied arable land, the role of hired labor on the demesne-*robot* farms and large peasant farms, and the existence of a sufficient number of workers for the eventual development of manufactures. The basic monographs dealing with loose people and Kula's model proposition seem to suggest the "marginality" of this problem. The nobility, however, thought otherwise and attempted to prevent the "loose" elements from seasonal migrations. See Józef Gierowski, "Luźni ludzie na Mazowszu w świetle uchwał sejmikowych," *Przegląd Historyczny*, 40 (1949): 164-202. It is also difficult to accept the marginality of the vagrant population, since it appears that larger peasant farms throughout the country could not have maintained themselves without their labor. They were also used by demesne-*robot* farms.

not one of independent elements coercing and being coerced, but one of shifting interdependences between elements in contractual relation to each other. In villages settled under German law the charters usually specified what obligations the peasants owed in return for use of the lord's land. Both the lord's ownership of the land and the peasants' personal freedom were implicit conditions of these contracts. Although limitations on peasant freedom of movement, first set by Casimir the Great in 1348, were later confirmed and expanded, and although legal jurisdiction over the peasantry slipped from the state's into the gentry's hands, research thus far indicates that peasants never lost their legal entity. A peasant could appear in court as plaintiff and defendant, he had full rights of ownership of movable property, and in some cases he could buy, sell, and bequeath land.

At the same time, peasants had no judicial protection in regard to the *robot* system, and their real legal position changed from district to district, from manor to manor, subject entirely to the discretion of the landowner. The well-known *sejm* resolutions placing a limit on *robot* labor, like laws regarding peasant flight, were passed on behalf of gentry whose peasants were being enticed away in times of economic boom.

At the end of the sixteenth century, investment of capital in land appears to have guaranteed the largest and perhaps also the safest returns, causing a withdrawal of money from industry and trade. The enormous wealth of the Boner family, merchants who played a role under the Sigismunds comparable to that of the Fuggers, was converted into land, as was that of the Morsztyns and a great many others. At the same time, in place after place, peasants were finding it impossible to keep up with high money rents. For some reason, perhaps because of economies of scale relating to transport or marketing, peasants could not consistently take advantage of high grain prices to convert their surpluses into cash. As a result, they had to surrender some of the risks and opportunities of surplus production to the manor, in return for greater security in the form of a hereditary plot of land for which they paid nominal rent and heavy *robot* obligations. If they wished to increase their production for sale, there was often land available which they could cultivate at the price of additional obligations, but they no longer *had* to depend on the market to pay their rent. An illustration of the resulting interdependence between lord and peasants is the fact that at the very time when peasant flight constituted the greatest disaster for a landlord, the most effective threat against refractory peasants was eviction.

By now it should be clear that Rutkowski's generally accepted outline of the origin and development of the demesne-*robot* economy does not explain much of the data accumulated by subsequent historians. We have seen, for example, that the rise of *robot* obligations was accompanied not only by the

decline of sixteen-hectare peasant farms, and by an increase in the number of peasants having little or no land, but also by an increase of arable land in the hands of rich peasants. In view of this, it is unfortunate that the role of rich peasants in regional economic life has not been studied. With the exception of Crown Prussia, the rich peasant is treated as an exceptional and marginal phenomenon, confirming the general rule of peasant poverty and subjection. We have also seen how in certain areas of the Commonwealth the *demesne-robot* system did not appear at all, in some it was insignificant, and in others it appeared only in the second half of the seventeenth century or even in the eighteenth century, when attempts were already being made to reinstitute rent in formerly *robot* areas. How much were these differences the product of conscious choice; how much were they determined by social and economic realities? The problem of the scope and importance of "economic" motives in the activities of nobles, townspeople, and peasants is connected with this issue. There is a strong tendency to look at the origin and development of the *demesne-robot* system through the prism of grain production, even though we are aware of other economic enterprises (for example, a considerable export cattle trade with annual sales in the tens of thousands, fully developed sheep-breeding, and intensive gardening). Such matters as the existence of large peasant farms employing hired labor, an active handicraft industry, the flow of population between towns and villages, the dual role of peasants as sellers and buyers in the domestic market, and the presence of a substantial vagrant population, should compel us to take a cautious approach to the problem of neo-serfdom. With the exception of the Mączak study, we still do not have works attempting to describe the *totality* of regional economic life over a long period of time.

Until these studies are made and historians venture more boldly beyond the hedges of villages and the *demesne-robot* of crown lands, then the synthetic articles, interesting economic models, and didactic textbook generalizations can only serve to reveal the methodological inadequacy of their concept of a "neo-serfdom."