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RUTHENIA, COSSACKDOM, THE UKRAINE, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF TWO NATIONS¹

Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* Warszawa: 1985. Pp. 189

Scholarly works devoted even to distant periods of Ukrainian history tend to evoke political echoes, not only in Kiev but in Moscow and Warsaw as well. For example, attempts to view the baptism of Rus' (described in the majority of the textbooks printed in the USSR, Poland, and the United States as the baptism of "Russia") as an important turning point of Ukrainian history are not infrequently seen as an unreasonable, ultranationalistic distortion of the continuity of Russian history. It seemingly counts for nothing that up until the 18th century today's "Russia" was known as "Moscow" and viewed as a foreign power by the Orthodox Ruthenian subjects of the Polish Crown and Lithuanian Grand Duchy, or that even after the Treaty of Andrussovo (1667) the Muscovite ministry of foreign affairs continued to treat the Cossack Ukraine as an alien vassal state. Such considerations have not deterred the Russians from styling the Ukrainians as "younger brothers" who allegedly had dreamed for centuries of unification with Moscow/Russia; nor have they deterred the Russians from viewing that "reunification" as the natural, inevitable outcome of historical progress.

The Poles, for their part, have long sought to squeeze Ukrainians under the rubric of "*gente Ruthenus natione Polonus*," portraying the more resistant among them as rebellious sons of a common fatherland. Polish historiography has tended to treat the population of Kievan Rus' as little more than eventual candidates for Polish or Muscovite subjecthood rather than as a separate nation (*naród*) in their own right. The separateness of the Ruthenians — well attested by 16th and 17th-century sources — has often been treated as if it were insufficient grounds for considering this people a "historical" nation.

¹ This article came into being in the course of a larger study of nationality questions in the Commonwealth of Two Nations, although it took this shape as a result of reflections inspired by the work of Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel. It was written with the support of a summer stipend from the Graduate School of Georgetown University. While thanking my university, I would also like to express my gratitude to Mr. Robert Scott for his translation of the text.

Given such political assumptions, Russian and Polish historiography have not devoted much attention to the study of Ukrainian historical tradition. It is hardly surprising, since every monograph conceding a long pedigree to Ukrainian national consciousness limits the terrain that Polish and Russian ideology and historiography can claim for themselves.

In light of this, I fear that the innovative work of Dr. Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* [The national consciousness of the Ukrainian nobility and the Cossacks from the end of the 16th to the middle of the 17th century], will meet with considerable politically motivated criticism. I would not like my reservations to be taken in this light, and therefore hasten at the outset to congratulate her for her scholarly courage and her ability to pose questions that point the way toward a revision of many of our basic conclusions about the nationality issues of the seventeenth century. Hopefully, this work, appearing at the same time as Frank Sysyn's study of Adam Kisiel,² will contribute to an enlivening of studies of the history of the Commonwealth of Two Nations as a whole.

Before moving on to a more detailed evaluation of this work, a few words about its overall organization are in order. The book consists of seven chapters, only four of which relate directly to the central theme. The longest of these, on "The Role of Religion in the Development of National Consciousness Among the Nobility and Cossacks," comprises almost as many pages (forty-two) as the other three combined.* Of the book's remaining chapters, the second ("Introduction to Historiography and Sources") provides a good overall introduction to the study. Much less satisfactory, however, are the first and seventh. The first, entitled "Theoretical and Methodological Problems of the Study of National Consciousness," is frankly unbearable. In it, Chynczewska-Hennel tries to outline her own approach to the problem of national consciousness against the background of earlier attempts to grapple with the question, as well as to describe her use of her sources. While successful in the latter task, she fails miserably in the former. I am not too surprised that in seeking her own definitions she has followed in the reliable footsteps of Handelsman, Chałasiński, and Zientara, but I cannot understand the reasoning behind her somewhat haphazard survey of the views of a whole range of somewhat less relevant figures, from Renan and Durkheim to Topolski and Wiatr.

² Frank E. Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine. The Dilemma of Adam Kisiel, 1600-1653*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1985.

* "The Role of a Common Language and Tradition in the National Consciousness of the Nobility and Cossacks from the End of the 16th to the Middle of the 17th Century"; "Konstanty Ostrogski, Peter Mohyla, and Piotr Konashevych-Sahaidachnyi — National Heroes?"; and "Gente Ruthenus, Nazione Polonus."

Likewise irritating and devoid of intellectual rigor is Chapter Seven — “Examples of the Formation of National Consciousness in Other European Countries.” A rather arbitrary and superficial presentation of selected examples from Italy, Spain, and Ireland, it offers nothing to a better understanding of the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness. For instance, the widely over-used Italian example drawn from the writings of Dante is poorly chosen, as it ultimately involves reflections on the ideal of universal monarchy rather than any kind of national sovereignty. More appropriate, perhaps, would have been an analysis of the patriotism of the Italian city-states, who were eager to create a local tradition that could justify their de facto independence from the Empire. Even a simple comparison of the role of historical tradition — enriched by myth and legend — in Florence, Venice, and Kiev would have been more enlightening than these references to attempts to rebuild imperial Rome or the book’s digressions, however interesting in and of themselves, on the Spanish theme. A serious comparative analysis of the role of social revolution on changes in national consciousness (e.g., in the Netherlands vs. the Ukraine) would certainly have been more interesting than a discussion of the Irish case. Above all, this chapter and the entire book, for that matter, lack any analysis of Polish national consciousness, or even any indication of the changes in the national consciousness of those parts of Rus’ earlier incorporated into Poland by Kazimierz the Great. A list of sources and literature is appended, as is a very short list of problems discussed, which is characterized as a “Conclusion” but in fact provides little more than raw materials for a summary. Finally, an index of personal names facilitates the use of this volume, which was published in an edition of 3500.³

Any author dealing with questions of national consciousness in the Crown and Lithuania must attempt to clarify the meaning of such terms as “Commonwealth,” “Poland,” “Lithuania,” “Ruthenia,” and “Ukraine.” Unfortunately, Chynczewska-Hennel has failed to do so or, to put it more precisely, has failed to do so in any systematic fashion. The title of her book suggests that she intends to write about the Ukrainian nobility and Cossack elite, but it rapidly becomes clear that her study embraces not merely the *województwa* (palatinates) of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, but also Volhynia, Podolia, and other “ethnically Ruthenian (Ukrainian) territories.”⁴ Her account

³ The book, which is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation, was published by Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. The sponsor of the dissertation was the distinguished historian Zbigniew Wójcik.

⁴ Chynczewska-Hennel, *op. cit.*, p. 35. For further treatment of the problems of national consciousness and a better understanding of the political and cultural diversity of the seventeenth century, see: Waclaw Lipiński, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, Kiev-Kraków: 1912, pp. 47–54; W. Tomkiewicz, “O składzie społecznym i etnicznym kozaczyzny ukraińskiej na przełomie XVI–SVII wieków,” *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 37, 1948; Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr., “The Ukraine and the Dialectics of National-Building,” in *The Development of the USSR*, ed. by D. Treadgold, Seattle: 1964.

ranges over an enormous terrain extending from Polotsk, Minsk, and Lutsk to Kiev, Ostrog, Lviv (Lwów), and Przemyśl. Presumably, she does not mean to argue that this entire region constituted the Ukraine, but she clearly considers the national consciousness found on these territories to have been more or less the same. Unfortunately, she thereby loses sight of the uniqueness of the Cossacks against the background of the rest of Ruthenia.

The terms "Poles," "*Liakh*," (Poles), "Lithuanian," "Ruthenian," and "Cossack" have all assumed somewhat different meanings in the hands of different writers. For that matter, they do not always have the same meaning in religious and legal texts. They were understood differently in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We are, therefore, still in need of a sensible examination of the problem *sine ira et studio*. For the purposes of this article, I will use the term "Ruthenians" to designate the Orthodox and Uniate population of the Crown and Lithuania.

From the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, Ruthenians were subjected to a rapid series of changes that effected their subsequent history as a nation. The Ruthenian nobility was finally accorded complete equality with the nobility of Lithuania in 1566, ending a long period of second-class status within the Grand Duchy.⁵ (Those Ruthenians incorporated into the Crown in 1569 obtained all of the privileges already enjoyed by the Polish nobility as well as by the Ruthenian nobility on the lands earlier incorporated into the Crown by Kazimierz the Great.) They gained the possibility of defending their rights through the agency of the *sejmiki* (dietines) and of influencing policy through participation in the Commons and Senate. However, except for the Orthodox and—later—Uniate churches, they lacked any corporate institutions comparable to the state apparatus of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or the local parliaments of Prussia with which to defend their specific group interests.

By the act of the Union of Lublin in 1569, the land and people of the former Kievan lands in the Dniepr basin, stretching almost all the way from the Black Sea to the Baltic and once united under Lithuanian rule, were now divided between the Crown and Grand Duchy. (One cannot help wondering what the territorial and demographic shape of the Ukraine would have been today if the Khmel'nyts'kyi's uprising had taken place in an undivided Lithuania, even one in union with Poland.)

As a result of these divisions, there were now three large and fairly distinct regions within the state inhabited by Ruthenians: the *województwo* of Rus' and adjacent areas, well accustomed to Polish ways and to living with a sig-

⁵ See literature in J. Pelensky, "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland, 1569. Socio-Material Interest and Ideology—a Reexamination," in *American Contributions to the Seventh International Congress of Slavists*, Warsaw, August 21–17, 1973, vol. III, The Hague and Paris: 1973, pp. 19–52.

nificant population of relatively more recent Polish settlers; the lands of future Belorussia in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had to act through the parliamentary and administrative channels of that political unit; and the lands of Volhynia, Bratslav, Kiev, and Chernihiv. The latter two regions had much in common in terms of their social and political structure, and all three regions shared strong bonds of culture and Kievan tradition. Nonetheless, the new conditions created by Lublin demanded new means for expressing unity within diversity while coming to terms with the new political situation. One such attempt was the ecclesiastical union of the Catholic and Orthodox churches at Brześć in 1596, an undertaking mounted, it should be recalled, by Ruthenians. (The Union, in the eyes of its opponents, was to preserve the historical tradition of the Ruthenian church while according to that church a new and more legitimate status within the Commonwealth.) It failed to unite all Ruthenians not because of the opposition of the masses, but due to the combination of two traditionally conflicted elements — the oligarchic authority represented by Prince Konstanty Ostrogski and the force of the Cossacks. One may even conjecture that save for the Cossacks, the Orthodox hierarchy under the leadership of Mohyla and supported by Adam Kisiel (leader of the Orthodox laity), would have confirmed or renewed the Union of Brześć in the 17th century. Leaving aside the question of whether that would have been better or worse for the future of the Ukrainian nation, one must bear in mind the powerful new forces (Cossacks) as well as the traditional ones (nobility, albeit strengthened by recent political changes) that were pushing the Ruthenians in different directions.

In contrast to the nobility, peasants, and burghers, the Cossacks occupied only a part of the Ruthenian lands. They fought initially for their own professional interest (and even within their ranks there was a division of interests between hetmans, elite, and rank and file). Their uprisings, however, provided the peasantry with an opportunity to revolt against their noble lords and presented the Orthodox hierarchy and Ruthenian nobility with the dilemma of either containing them or collaborating with them.⁶ The Orthodox hierarchy's proclamation of Khmel'nyts'kyi as a Ruthenian Moses (with the role of Egyptians obviously relegated to the Poles) was one of the boldest steps ever taken by the Orthodox church in the direction of collaboration.⁷ With the support of the Orthodox Church and growing numbers of the local nobility who joined Khmel'nyts'kyi's forces, the self-conscious role of the Cossacks as state-

⁶ Sysyn, *Between Poland and Ukraine*, pp. 70, 71–74, 78–89. See the additional literature and sources there.

⁷ "Diariusz podróży do Pereaslavia i traktowania tamtejszego z Chmielnickim Panów Komissarzów Polskich przez Wojciecha Miaskowskiego podkomorzego lwowskiego spisany," in *Księga pamiętnicza Jakuba Michałowskiego*, ed. A. Helcel, Kraków: 1864, p. 377 (hereinafter *Księga pamiętnicza*); Paul of Aleppo, *The Travels of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch*, London: 1829, vol. 1, pp. 70–72.

builders was destined to grow. They also obtained recognition as a separate and sovereign nation.

The role of Ukrainian Piedmont ascribed to the Cossack-controlled Ukraine by later historians is not appropriate for the 17th century, however. The Cossacks did not consciously take upon themselves the task of restoring the vanished glory of the Kievan state or of uniting all Ruthenians under their rule. The sources from this period never confused the terms "Ruthenian" and "Cossack."⁸ The term "Ukrainian," moreover, is wholly unknown to the documents of the period. While one may now elect to associate the notion of "Ukrainian" with that of "Cossack" or concede the enormous role of the latter in the development of the nation, it should not be forgotten that the Cossacks in their time served — even if unwittingly — to narrow the scope of a once much broader Ruthenian nation: they were ultimately able to build a state only on those territories where they were successful in destroying the power of the oligarchy and subjugating the peasantry and townspeople.

The Cossack defenders of "Mother Ukraine," who often turned their wrath not only against the *Liakhy* but also against the Uniates and Ruthenian noblemen, are portrayed by Chynczewska-Hennel as acting in the name of all of Ruthenia, whose language, faith, and traditions they shared. Such an assumption has unfortunately introduced an enormous degree of conceptual ambiguity, by blending together distinctly divergent currents of Ruthenian national consciousness.

On the other hand, thanks to Chynczewska-Hennel, it will be very difficult for future scholars to continue the hitherto common practice of identifying the history and culture of the multinational Commonwealth with an anachronistic notion of Poland and Polishness. She is skeptical of interpretations which view the Ruthenian national process from the perspective of the "over-used" expression "*gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus*." She emphasizes, by contrast, a strong Ruthenian national consciousness as a crucial factor in the outbreak of the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, and she believes that in the first half of the seventeenth century one can speak of a separate Ukrainian nation, conscious of its individuality.

The reader, confronted with such a claim, might well ask where this nation had been at the time of the Union of Lublin in 1569.⁹ He might also find it hard to understand why such an active defender of Ruthenian interests as

⁸ Paul of Aleppo uses the name "Cossacks" as an ethnic term and also speaks of a Cossack state, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 78; J. Sobieski to J. Małachowski; and to A. Olszowski, "Pisma do wieku i spraw Jana Sobieskiego," ed. F. Kluczycki, in *Akta historyczne do objaśnienia Rzeczy Polskich służące*, Kraków: 1880, pp. 618–619, 631, 700.

⁹ Treated quite interestingly in the aforementioned work of Jarosław Pelenski (which was not used by Chynczewska-Hennel). Pelenski's text, incidentally, was also translated into Polish and published in Poland, in *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 68, 1975, no. 2.

Adam Kisiel was opposed to the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising. This book, with its identification (albeit subtle, and perhaps unintentional) of "good" Ruthenians with the participants the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, does nothing to help us understand the later efforts of the Cossack *starshyna* at Hadziacz to join themselves to Poland-Lithuania in a "Commonwealth of Three Nations."

A failure to closely examine either of the major historical events that frame this study — the Union of Lublin (1596) to the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising (1648) — has deprived Chynczewska-Hennel's discussion of the rigor imposed by the historically concrete. The testimony of even carefully chosen polemical writings can never be as eloquent as concrete actions — choosing sides in a struggle, swearing an oath of allegiance, or referring publicly, in the halls of Parliament rather than on the pages of a panegyric, to the inheritance of Vladimir and Roman. Chynczewska-Hennel's reluctance to become bogged down in a discussion of these historical turning points has precluded an opportunity for testing her hypotheses and refining her terminology. Nonetheless, no careful reader of this book will ever be able to view the enormous terrain of Ruthenia again through the eyes of a Rawita Gawroński, a Henryk Sienkiewicz, or even an Aleksander Jabłonowski. To put it differently, this work has accorded a new dimension to our understanding of the seventeenth-century Commonwealth.

Writing a revisionist work and a bold one at that, Chynczewska-Hennel has regrettably oversimplified her treatment of the Commonwealth and its "political nation" during this period. The Commonwealth and its "nation" are made to coincide too closely with the notion of Polishness, and Ruthenia with Orthodoxy and the Cossacks of the Ukraine.

Establishing the existence of a Ruthenian national consciousness and suggesting the existence of a Ukrainian nation, she dismisses the notion of a Commonwealth "nation." The latter, commonly referred to as the "*szlachta* nation," with Polish and Latin as its languages, has traditionally been identified by Polish (and foreign) historiography with Polish ethnicity. If the matter had actually been so simple, however, one could expect this nation, developing on the foundations of the Piast state, to have produced a Lechitic national tradition characterized by an essential Polishness. This, however, did not happen. The multinational character of the citizenry gave rise instead to a tradition transcending the Polish, known as the Sarmatian,¹⁰ a tradition that did not partake — in my view — of an ethnic sense of nationality.

¹⁰ The question of Sarmatianism is completely ignored. Only in one place does the author mention in passing that its significance in Lithuania was different than in Poland, where it implied knightly courage. No mention was made of the works of Tadeusz Mańkowski, *Genealogia sarmatyzmu*, Warszawa: 1946, Tadeusz Ulewicz, *Zagadnienie sarmatyzmu w kulturze i literaturze polskiej*, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, No. 59, Kraków: 1963, or Stanisław Cynarski, "Sarmatyzm—Ideologia, styl życia," in *Polska XVII wieku*, ed. by J. Tazbir, Warszawa: 1969, pp. 220–243. I differ in my understanding of Sarmatianism from Cynarski, who sees in it an ideological tool for eastward expansionism.

Following the incorporation of Halicz Ruthenia (1349), Mazowsze (1525), Prussia (1569), and Podlasia, Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kiev (1569) and the union with Lithuania (1569), important changes took place in the consciousness of the citizens of the Crown and Grand Duchy. These changes were apparent not only on the newly annexed territories, but in the Polish lands as well. Multinational *szlachta* solidarity, amply demonstrated in the time of the *sejmy* (parliaments), free elections, and confederations, helped to loosen older ethnic community ties dating back to the time of the Piasts. The primacy of linguistic, religious, and national differences was challenged by new divisions along political party lines. The operation of such parties, transcending ethnic or local barriers, can be observed not only during the free elections of kings or the time of the Zebrzydowski uprising, but also in the divisions between supporters of war and peace during the Khmel'nyts'kyi Uprising. A newly formed political community had created the powerful Sarmatian myth for itself, thereby weakening ethnic solidarity in the name of caste and state.

The phrase "*Polonus sum*" had a variety of meanings in the 17th century. It may have had its basis in an ethnic identity, but it also meant simply, that "I am a nobleman, one of the coauthors of the laws, an elector of the kings, and a free citizen of the Commonwealth." In no way did it necessarily imply an ethnic identity or an adoption of the Polish historical tradition. Poland in those days was small. In the eyes of Kromer and Starowolski, it extended no further eastward than the Wieprz and Wisłok rivers.¹¹ Polishness in a political sense, however, based on a share in political rule and in the rights of a citizen, extended as far as the Dniepr and the Dvina.

The conscious citizens of the Commonwealth were not united by ethnicity or by the conviction that Poland lay on the Wisla, but by the time-tested belief

¹¹ "Poland, known to the ancients as European Sarmatia, now ruled by the most wise King Sigismund III, joins under one scepter eight provinces, which in part differ from one another in customs, laws, language, and way of life, but in terms of privileges of freedom and access to laws in the Commonwealth, are without exception equal."—Szymon Starowolski, *Polska albo opisanie położenia Królestwa Polskiego*, Kraków: 1776, p. 59. See also pp. 69 and 90. Interestingly, the capital of ancient Sarmatia, which was a terror "even for the Romans," according to Starowolski, was not one of the Polish cities, but Kiev (p. 96). Maciej z Miechowa in his fundamental *Tractatus de duabus Sarmatiis, Asiatica et Europiana et de contentis in eis*, which appeared in 1517 (Polish text translated and edited by T. Bienkowski, with introduction by H. Barycz and afterword by W. Voisé), holds that "European Sarmatia comprises the territories inhabited by the Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Muscovites, and those neighboring them. Its territory extends from the Wisla River in the West to the Don River in the East" (p. 28.) This is quite different from Starowolski's "Poland, known to the ancients as European Sarmatia." Starowolski weakens his claim later in the text when, again in opposition to Miechovitus, he excludes Moscow from European Sarmatia, but calls Poland "Vandalia" (p. 89). We are already quite far here from Długosz, who made Lech (the brother of Czech but not of Rus') the king of European Sarmatia and listed among his descendants the Polish prince Kij, founder of Kiev (J. Kłoczowski, "Polacy a cudzoziemcy w XV wieku," in *Swojskość i cudzoziemczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej*, ed. by Zofia Stefanowska, Warszawa: 1973, pp. 53–54).

that "the fatherland is to be sought not in walls, not in borders, not in landed properties, but in the exercise of rights and freedoms."¹² The nation developing on the basis of such theory and practice was very much alive and even outlived the collapse of its state. It melted away like March snow, however, in the era of national Darwinism, enabling later mythology and historiography to ascribe a more narrowly Polish form to it and to identify it exclusively with the people living along the Wisła. Such a view, however, is about as accurate as identifying the now-forgotten Great Novgorodian state with the Russian nation.

The Commonwealth nation was not simply an expanded version of the Polish nation. Nor was it merely a mechanical combination of three nations and three national consciousnesses (Polish, Lithuanian, Ruthenian), held together temporarily by the "class" interests of the nobility. Nonetheless, we can speak of the existence of three ethnic nations alongside the Sarmatian one. The national consciousness of their members, non-noble as well as noble, a problem that has been little studied, was dependent upon social position, education, and degree of political involvement. (Of course, the consciousness and actions of the non-noble members of these ethnic nations was of only marginal significance for the consciousness of the Commonwealth's ruling Sarmatian nation. Social groups excluded from the exercise of rights and liberties were *subjects*, not *citizens*, of the Commonwealth. For this reason, peasants and townspeople (whether Poles, Lithuanians, or Ruthenians) just as much as Jews and Cossacks, were, formally at least, dependent on the will of the noble citizens of the Commonwealth, who made its laws.¹³

¹² I cite Krzysztof Radziwiłł's definition of "fatherland" after Henryk Wisner, who recognized it to be, not incorrectly, "the political credo of *szlachta* society" (Henryk Wisner, *Najświętsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej, XVI–XVII wieku*, Warszawa: 1978, p. 234.

¹³ The problem of "vertical" (inter-caste) national bonds vs. "horizontal" (intra-caste) ones has still not been well studied. Their relative significance was certainly subject to great change. The annexation of Halicz Ruś by Kazimierz the Great and the presence of an ethnically alien town population (in the Middle Ages) and Jewish community had forced some discussion of the concepts of "native" and "foreign" (and a redefinition of the concept of "nation") already well before the Union of Lublin. These discussions, reflecting differences in national consciousness, became quite sharp in the period following the Partitions. There are fundamental differences between the revolutionary view that all inhabitants of the pre-Partition Commonwealth were Poles and the changing definitions of Mickiewicz (T. Lepkowski, "Poglądy na jedno i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku," and Z. Stefanowska, "Mickiewicz wśród żywiołów, both in *Swojskość*, pp. 232–233, 246–275. Stefanowska, in her very interesting article, refers to Mickiewicz's definition of "fatherland," containing echoes of the above-mentioned statement of Radziwiłł. *Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna*, with articles by such outstanding specialists as Zientara, Kłoczowski, Wyczański, Tazbir, Michalski, Klimowicz, Jedlicki, Lepkowski, Stefanowska, Skarga, and Lipski, should also have been utilized by the author. See also J. Jakubowski, *Studia nad stosunkami narodowościowymi na Litwie przed unią lubelską*, Warszawa: 1912; S. Kot, "Nationum proprietates," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, No. 6 (1955); T. Ulewicz, *Sarmacja. Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej XV i XVI wieku*,

In the seventeenth century the political nation of the Commonwealth was quite heterogeneous in cultural and religious terms. However, all too often today, in general surveys of the prepartition period, the terms "Pole" and "Polish" are used in their ethnic and culturally assimilative sense in describing the multinational Commonwealth. Too often the wide-ranging legal, social, economic, and cultural differences found on the territory of this enormous state are underplayed. The Poland of Kochanowski and Rej, of Opaliński and Fredro, of the genuine, well-established parliamentarism of the Sienickis, Ossolińskis, Herburts, and Leszczyńskis, with its manorial farms, mass export of grain, and stubborn constitutionalism, is all too frequently transposed to the regions of Lutsk, Kiev, or Bobruisk. Whoever does so falsifies the past of the Commonwealth, ascribing to it — in contradiction of historical fact — an imperial character.

For this reason, too I feel that Chynczewska-Hennel is right to emphasize elements of cultural separateness, pointing out the vitality of Ukrainian national sentiments. I do not feel that she is right, however, in attempting, on the basis of evidence drawn from popular folklore and religious pamphlets, to detach the Ruthenian nobility from the community of "political Polishness" and attach it to the Cossack Ukraine. In the name of Ukrainian national solidarity, she has excessively downplayed the very significant differences between Ruthenian citizens and Ruthenian subjects. What is more, she is too eager, on the basis of religion, language, and tradition, to posit a commonality of goals between the Cossacks and the Ruthenian noblemen.

Undoubtedly, the Cossack elite, itself often of *szlachta* origin, was closer to the Ruthenian nobility in cultural and political terms than it was to the Cossack rank-and-file, but after all, it was precisely this elite, reinforced by the Ruthenian nobility, who would attempt to create a Ruthenian rather than military-Cossack state at Hadziacz in 1658,¹⁴ despite the opposition of the "gray masses" of Cossacks.

The book's examination of such heroic noble exemplars of Ruthenianness as Konasheych-Sahaidachnyc, Mohyla, and Konstanty Ostrogski in fact reveals just how close they were to the Ruthenian opponents of Khmel'nyts'kyi or to the later proponents of the Union of Hadziacz. The mass of Cossacks would bitterly settle accounts with the descendants of the Sahaidacznycs and

Kraków: 1950; J. Tazbir, "Ksenofobia w Polsce XVI i XVII wieku," in *Arianie i katolicy*, Warszawa: 1971; C. Backvis, "Les themes majeurs de la pense politique polonaise au XVI siecle," in *Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, v.14, Brussels: 1957.

¹⁴ With assurance of the rights of the army and the exceptionally high position of the hetman (A. Kaminski, "The Cossack Experiment in Szlachta Democracy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: The Hadiach (Hadziacz) Union," in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1977), pp. 178–197).

the Ostrogskis. The Cossacks' hero was Semen Nalyvaiko, hated by the Ruthenian gentry. (At the same time, the zealous monastic defenders of Orthodoxy considered the epithet "*nalewajki*," applied to them by Catholic bigots, to be nothing short of slander.)¹⁵

In the seventeenth century, conditions undoubtedly favored the formation of a Ukrainian state in the regions of Cossack military activity. Up until the time of Palij (1702), successive Cossack uprisings were able to spread northward with special ease, as if drawn by historical memory along the path of the earlier Kievan state. On these territories, the towns willingly "Cossackized" themselves. Here, too, were many *szlachta* who placed service to the Zaporozhian army above service to the local oligarchs. Finally, in this region Cossack patterns of self-rule were able to gain the support of the townspeople and peasantry with unusual ease. By contrast, we do not observe any significant "Cossackization" of the towns, villages, and districts of the strongly Orthodox *województwo* of Rus'. In other words, while the Cossacks had the strength needed to build a state, they represented such a powerfully radicalizing element that they left a significant part of Ruthenia behind them. The Cossacks, coming out in the name of "Mother Ukraine," expected and demanded the support of all of Ruthenia, and they denounced their Ruthenian opponents as traitors to the nation. Among the latter they numbered not only Jerema Wiśniowiecki, but Iosafat Kuntsevych and Adam Kisiel as well. They viewed with suspicion or hostility the Cossack *starshyna*, the Ruthenian nobility, and that part of the Orthodox clergy that sought to create a Ruthenian principality that would place limits on the Cossack-military monopoly of power.

This very real divergence between Ruthenian and Cossack demands was ignored by the historical writing of the 18th century and later by the mainstream of Ukrainian historiography. However, one should not forget the serious differences between the nobility's (and much of the Cossack elite's) conception of the state and that of the mass of Cossacks. As I have already indicated, I do not deny the existence of a national consciousness among the Cossacks, but I do want to point out the existence of a Ruthenian consciousness as well on territories extending much further than the Ukraine. The Cossack state, growing out of the tradition of Nalyvaiko, Pawluk, or Sulyma, stood at loggerheads with the traditions of Ruthenia, shaped by the patronage of Konstany Ostrogski, Piotr Mohyla, or Adam Kisiel.¹⁶

¹⁵ Fabian Birkowski complained that the Crown, an imprudent goat, had nourished with her milk two wolf cubs—i.e., "the heretics and the Nalyvaikos"—who now tore at her body (F. Birkowski, *O dysydentach i heretykach*, published in 1632; cited after Z. Ogonowski, *Filozofia i myśl społeczna XVII wieku*, Warszawa: 1979, p. 503; see also pp. 507, 508.

¹⁶ "The king has acted as a king, but you kinglets and princes have misbehaved and now have finally stirred up trouble for yourselves," was addressed, after all, not to "*Liakhy*," but to the

Chynczewska-Hennel devotes much attention to the role of the Orthodox faith,¹⁷ an element which, in her view, bound the enormous territories of Ruthenia in the Crown and Lithuania into one. Indeed, it would be difficult to overestimate the unifying role of any religion, particularly in moments of challenge to church and society by a common enemy. (A Polish reader will think immediately of the opposition engendered by Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, or of Solidarity.) Nonetheless, Chynczewska-Hennel, in her analysis of the problem of religion and church, is excessively swayed by the rhetoric of her sources, which were written by Orthodox clerics. The latter, for their part, considered those who had abandoned Orthodoxy to be traitors to their Ruthenian heritage. (It should be remembered that Piotr Skarga¹⁸ likewise doubted the patriotism of Polish heretics.)

Polemical accusations notwithstanding, it is good to remember that Kievan or Volhynian Uniates did not cease to feel themselves Ruthenians any more than the Commonwealth's Calvinists ceased to consider themselves Poles or Lithuanians. National consciousness was not one and the same thing as allegiance to a particular religious denomination, although the churches sought to impose the stereotyped identification of Pole with Catholicism and Ruthenian with Orthodoxy. Contrary to the generally accepted view, I would argue that Ruthenian national feelings (just as their Polish and Lithuanian counterparts) did not originate from religious faith, even though the rival clergies struggled to forge such a link. Despite the proclaimed universality of their doctrine, the churches were quite capable of supporting national divisions within the framework of a single faith. The sense of separateness, if not animosity, that existed between Greeks and Muscovites was proverbial, and Chynczewska-Hennel has clearly demonstrated a similar sense of alienness dividing Orthodox Ruthenes and Orthodox Muscovites.¹⁹

Orthodox Ruthenians (Adam Kisiel, Maksymilian Brzozowski, Zakharii Chetvertyn'skyi, and Mikolaj Potii), who come to negotiate with Khmel'nyts'kyi in January-February of 1649. (Quoted by a Catholic member of the commission, Jakub Miaskowski—*Księga pamiętnicza*, ed. A. Helcel, Kraków: 1864, p. 371.)

¹⁷ The historical literature has long pointed to the influence of the Orthodox hierarchy on Ruthenian state-building and on the princely aspirations of Khmel'nyts'kyi, 1648–1657, ed. I. Krypiakewych and I. Butych, Kiev: 1961; *Księga pamiętnicza*, pp. 4–6, 31, 42–43, 44–46, 49, 74–77, 96–97, 213–214, 371–382; and Sysyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–149, 156–158, 164–165—see the literature cited there). It is interesting to recall that for Samuel Twardowski, Khmel'nyts'kyi, however reprehensible, was the son of a common "fatherland." The Dniepr Cossacks would be characterized as a "foreign nation" only half a century later (Erazm Otwinowski, *Dzieje Polski pod panowaniem Augusta II*, Kraków: 1848, p. 316).

¹⁸ Piotr Skarga, *Kazania sejmowe*, edited by J. Tazbir with the help of Mierosław Korolko, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk: 1972, pp. 93–101.

¹⁹ Ipatyi Potyi: "Who is unaware of how much crudeness, stubbornness, and superstition there is among the Muscovite people?" (cited by Chynczewska-Hennel, p. 146).

I would also counsel caution in ascribing too much Orthodox zeal to the Cossacks. Familiarity with the tenets of the faith and participation in regular church life by the broad masses of the population left much to be desired on the territories of Ruthenia, especially in frontier areas, where conditions did not encourage the development of a dense network of parishes. I do not want to make too much of the well-known contemporary observation that the Cossacks were “*religionis nullius*,”²⁰ but it would be equally wrong to view the Cossacks in the role their monastic compatriots sought to cast for them—that of knightly Orthodox crusaders.

Chynczewska-Hennel has assembled much interesting new material on the question of Cossack attitudes toward the church, drawn chiefly from the observations of Venetian and Vatican diplomats. Whatever their overall implications, these observations, along with the concerted action of the Cossacks in defense of Orthodoxy, leave no doubt about Zaporozhian support for the Orthodox clergy. Support was particularly apparent in the period following the Union of Brześć, when it had the character of a collaboration between “outcasts.” The Orthodox hierarchy, however, was always careful not to identify itself completely with the Cossacks and severing its ties with the Commonwealth or the nobility. Nor, prior to Khmel’nyts’kyi, did it offer unqualified support to the Cossack uprisings.

From the moment of the reestablishment of the Orthodox hierarchy (1620) until the time of Hadiach (Hadziacz) (1658), the petitions of the Cossacks are full of religious demands. At times one almost has the impression that the Cossack struggle was motivated primarily by the interests of the Orthodox church. This, however, merely proves the existence of strong common interests on the part of the Cossacks and the Orthodox church. It in no way proves the existence of a profound Cossack religiosity of the kind promoted by the monks of the Dniepr. Moreover, when the actions of the Orthodox hierarchy clashed with the political interests of the Cossacks, the latter were quick to part company. One can see this in accounts of Cossack opposition at the Orthodox synod of 1629, where the hierarchy and representatives of the Ruthenian nobility proposed a new union with Rome, or in the destruction of the Hadziacz pacts by the Cossack rank-and-file despite that treaty’s provision for the establishment of Orthodoxy at the expense of the Uniates.²¹

Naturally, many members of the Cossack elite came from families closely linked to the church. Part of them received their education in orthodox schools. The deep religiosity of many Cossacks or at least their attachment to Orthodoxy cannot be doubted. It is beautifully illustrated, for example, by the testament of Sahaidachnyi, cited by Chynczewska-Hennel. Moreover, as the Cossack *starshyna* secured its position, its ties with the Orthodox church grew

²⁰ Chynczewska-Hennel, p. 74; Z. Wójcik, *Dzikie Pola w ogniu*, Warszawa: 1968, p. 72.

²¹ Sysyn, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–62.

still closer. Nonetheless, it is worth recalling, in an effort to maintain some sense of perspective, the strong—not to say rude—words of a Czerkasy colonel, Fedor Wesniak, to a Catholic priest, Lętowski, in February 1649: “[both] our priests and *popy* are sons of whores.”²²

It is impossible to discuss the problems of 17th-century Ruthenia without making reference to the Uniate church. Ruthenians’ sense of cultural unity and commonality of interest, symbolized by a common ecclesiastical organization, had clearly been shaken by the Union of Brześć, and it is obvious that the militant Orthodoxy supported by the Cossacks in the period that followed represented a mortal threat to the Union. Indeed, it is from this period that the over-hasty tendency to identify “good” Ruthenians with Orthodoxy has its origins. Unfortunately, Chynczewska-Hennel, by giving in to this tendency, misses an opportunity to fully explore the fascinating relationship between two ecclesiastical establishments, each claiming to be acting for the “good of the nation.” One must grant, however, that Chynczewska-Hennel does a good job of indicating the deep sense of national consciousness that prevailed among the Uniate clergy during the first decades of the 17th century.

While beyond the limits of the work under discussion, it is worth remembering that the *ritus Ruthenus*, popularly known as the *ritus rusticus*, not only protected its flock against Polonization but also against the Russification to which so many of the heroes of Cossack Orthodoxy succumbed when they joined the ranks of the Russian *dvorianstvo*.²³ The Uniate Church, “despite” its intellectual ties to the West helped to preserve a Ruthenian national individuality and contributed actively to the Ukrainian national renaissance of the 19th century.

Chynczewska-Hennel’s scholarly sophistication, so obvious in her initial treatment of the Ruthenian consciousness of the Uniates, abandons her completely when she ascribes the Union of Brześć to Polish-Vatican pressure (“the Union of Brześć, forced on Ruthenia by Rome and Poland”).²⁴ I suspect that she is succumbing here to the emotional temptation to associate the Commonwealth exclusively with the Catholic *Liakhy*, forgetting that the parliamentarians of the Crown and Lithuania during this period, many of them Protestant and Orthodox, would hardly have been inclined to waste their efforts in strengthening the Catholic church. Quite the opposite. And how could Papal Rome, long incapable of forcing the Commonwealth to destroy Protestantism, have suddenly found the strength to impose anything on Ruthenia?

²² *Księga pamiętnicza*, p. 373.

²³ Zenon Kohut, “The Ukrainian elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility,” in *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, ed. by I. Banac and P. Bushkovitch, Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, New Haven: 1983, pp. 65–97.

To presume such a possibility is clearly a distortion. It would be safer simply to assert that Sigismund III, the Jesuits (Skarga), part of the Catholic clergy, and the Papal nuncios were very interested in concluding the union. One can also note that the Commonwealth recognized the union and, up to a point, sought to defend the Uniates. However, from the point of view of the Uniates, Polish "help" was hardly a thing to be counted upon, as demonstrated later by Polish acceptance of the Union of Hadziacz, which provided for the abolition of the Uniate church and the establishment of Orthodoxy as the only "Ruthenian" faith. The Hadziacz Union was subscribed to not only by the Catholic monarch, Jan Kazimierz, but even by the Catholic archbishop of Gniezno and bishop of Wilno, who swore that they and their successors would ever after abide by this agreement.²⁵

The arch-Catholic Sigismund III, the Jesuits, and the papal nuncios, did not have the strength to force anything upon the Ruthenians. The initiative for ecclesiastical union came rather from the Ruthenian side. Granted, the original conception of the union may well have differed markedly from its final form. Perhaps, too, for the good of the Commonwealth, it would have been better to have sought the establishment of a patriarchate in Halicz or Kiev, as many have argued. Nonetheless, whatever the intentions of the Ruthenian initiators of the Union, they succeeded in creating a church which has continued, to the present day, to shore up a Ukrainian individuality.

We do not know the extent to which the union efforts of Metropolitan Mykhail Rohoza or bishops Ipatyi Potyi and Cyryl Terleckyi may have been influenced by the elevation of the metropolitan of Moscow to the rank of a patriarch in 1589, but there clearly seems to be some correlation between the growth of Muscovite power and the spread of the Union in Ruthenia. For example, the period following the treaty of Grzymultowski (1686), which had established "Eternal Peace" with Moscow and gave the tsar the right to act as protector of the Orthodox in Poland-Lithuania, saw a great wave of Ruthenian defections from Orthodoxy to the Uniate church. Significantly, too, the militant and vigorous Orthodox brotherhood of Lviv (Lwów) finally acceded to the Union only in 1708, just months after an extended visit to the region by the Orthodox Tsar Peter I and his army.

²⁴ Chynczewska-Hennel, p. 74. One is reminded of the Russian medal struck in 1839 to commemorate the "restoration" of the Uniates to the Orthodox fold—"Divided by force (1595), united by love (1839)—A. Deruga, *Piotr Wielki i unia a unia kościelna*, Wilno: 1936, p. 264.

²⁵ "I, Waclaw of Leszno, by the Grace of God Archbishop of Gniezno . . . swear . . . in my name and that of all of the clergy of the Polish Crown, that I and my successors will observe in all respects that which was discharged by the Commission in the name of His Majesty the King and the whole Commonwealth with the Zaporozhian Army and with the *whole nation* [emphasis mine—A.K.] of the Grand Principality of Rus' on September 6, 1658 at Hadziacz. . ." A similar oath, in his own name and that of all the Lithuanian clergy, was made by the Bishop of Wilno. (*Volumina Legum*, v. 4, St. Petersburg: 1855, ed. J. Ohryzko, p. 305.

In her discussion of the ecclesiastical union, Chynczewska-Hennel was heavily influenced by two voices. One was that of her Orthodox sources, and the other, that of the venerable historian Lypynskyi, who argued that the struggle between the churches was first and foremost a question of Ruthenian national consciousness.²⁶ Unfortunately, the great historian got a little carried away in his argument. Iosafat Kuntsevych and Meletii Smotryts'kyi, after all, even though Uniates, were Ruthenians, while one of the most beautiful defenses of the Ruthenians and Orthodoxy during the period was penned by Jan Szczęsny Herbut, himself a Roman Catholic.

Let us now turn to an examination of the published sources²⁷ and literature used for this study. In a work treating a subject of such breadth, and attempting to make use of sociological and anthropological research, it is difficult to be too picky about the omission of one title or another. I must confess, however, that I cannot understand why the list of printed sources includes Dante but leaves out Kromer, Starowolski, and Orzechowski. One finds Jerlicz here, but not the memoirs of Albrecht Stanisław Radziwiłł or the very useful collection of material published by Zbigniew Ogonowski.²⁸ Chynczewska-Hennel made a point of using the difficult-to-obtain *Archiwum Sapiehów* but passed over Bielski, Strykowski, Okolski, and the collection of materials published by J. Czubek. On the other hand, she made use of the rarely cited but unusually interesting travel notes of Paul of Aleppo. The Venetian materials also greatly enrich the work. One can only regret that she did not make it to the Moscow and Kiev archives. She would have found much of interest to her in both the Polish and the Greek *fondy* of the Central State Archive of Ancient Acts (TsGADA) in Moscow.

The list of important secondary works overlooked is considerably larger. Some of the omissions are simply shocking. One searches in vain, for example, for the fundamental study of Ludomir Bienkowski or for the two works of Oskar Halecki most closely related to this topic.²⁹ Also missing are essential

²⁶ Chynczewska-Hennel, p. 74.

²⁷ There is not a historian of culture who would differ with Chynczewska-Hennel's remark about "the incommensurability of the heuristic effort in comparison to the effects achieved." (p.6) For this reason, it is all the more essential to provide the reader with a precise list of the materials used. If there are, as the author suggests, hundreds of pages on which we cannot find a trace of information helping us to establishing the state of national consciousness, then like it or not, this also has implications for understanding the system of self-definition of that period. For example, one would like to know whether the omission of the several extant works of Jan Protasiewicz, author of the interesting *Inventores rerum* (Wilno: 1608), is a simple oversight or the result of tiresome labor which yielded no results.

²⁸ *Filozofia i myśl społeczna XVII wieku. cz. 1, opracował wstępem i przypisami opatrzył Zbigniew Ogonowski*. Warszawa: 1979. Even Piotr Skarga, it appears, is cited secondhand (he does not appear in the list of sources).

²⁹ L. Bieńkowski, "Organizacja kościoła wschodniego w Polsce," in *Kościół w Polsce*, ed. J. Kłoczowski, v. 2, Krakow: 1969, pp. 781-1049; O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest*

writings of Cynarski, Czaplński, Ulewicz, Korolko, Kosman, and Golobutski.³⁰ Room was found for the popular *Historia Irlandii*, but not for George Florovskii, Dmitrii Chizhevskii, or even the popular *Historia Białorusi*.³¹

In closing, let me briefly mention several problems which, for lack of space, I am unable to discuss in greater detail. Along with the absence of any deeper analysis of Polish national consciousness, one feels the lack of any discussion of Lithuanian consciousness. The author's decision not to address the problem of national consciousness among the Ruthenian townspeople is likewise limiting. In particular, some examination of the Orthodox brotherhoods in the towns and the role they played alongside the clergy and nobility would be welcome here. In addition, while the historical tradition presented in the book concentrates around Kiev, the reader would like to hear more about other important local centers, particularly Belorussian ones like Połock or Brześć. The degree to which local traditions may have been withering away at the expense of either the Kievan-centered Ruthenian one or the Sarmatian one would have perhaps provided an interesting measure of the kinds of processes Chynczewska-Hennel is dealing with.

The Reformation does not play any significant role in the book, although its influence on the national languages and on the national consciousness of Ruthenians converting to Calvinism or Arianism would seem to have demanded at least a few paragraphs. Likewise, while the majority of *gymnasium* students would probably have agreed with the Orthodox monk who said that the devil had invented Latin for no good end, it would have been worth devoting more

(1439–1596), Rome: 1958; and *ibid.*, “Unia brzeska w świetle współczesnych źródeł greckich,” in *Sacrum Poloniae Millenium*, vol. 1, Rome: 1954.

³⁰ See notes 10 and 13. There is not even one work of Władysław Czaplński, e.g., “Myśl polityczna w Polsce w okresie reformacji w dobie kontreformacji (1573–1655),” in *Wiek XVII. Kontreformacja, Barok*, ed. J. Pelc, Wrocław: 1970, or *O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej*, Warszawa: 1966. V.A. Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kozachestvo*, Kiev: 1957; M. Korolko, *Klejnot swobodnego sumienia*, Warszawa: 1974; M. Kosman, *Reformacja i kontreformacja w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w świetle propagandy wyznaniowej*, Wrocław: 1973. There is only a very limited amount of literature on the Uniate church (which could have been found in Bienkowski's work at the very least). Likewise lacking are works of J. Bardach, C. Backvis, W. Weintraub, J. Tretiak, I.I. Lappo, and V.I. Picheta. Naturally, the list could be extended, but the gist of my criticism is clear. The list of literature which she provides is unfortunately not a good guide for acquainting oneself with the basic literature on the topic.

³¹ M. Kosman, *Historia Białorusi*, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk: 1979; G. Florovskii, *Puti russkogo bogosloviia*, Paris: 1937; D. Chyzhevskii, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Literatury*, New York: 1959. Chynczewska-Hennel has also neglected J. Abramowska, “Kochanowskiego lekcja historii,” in *Pamiętnik Literacki*, v. 75 (1984), no. 4 (interesting information on Sarmatian mythology, pp. 61–67); B. Otwinowska, *Język-naród-kultura. Antecedencje i motywy renesansowej myśli o języku*, Wrocław: 1974; J. Malicki, *Mity narodowe. Lechiada*, Wrocław: 1982.

attention to the influence of classical antiquity and neo-Latin literature on the culture of Ruthenia in this period.

In a book emphasizing the significance of religion in the formation of national consciousness, it is worth remembering that down until the time of Słuck (1767), the Ruthenian nobility refused to serve—in the name of their faith—the Orthodox tsar. They were bound to the Commonwealth not only by the bonds of “class” interests (which the tsar could respect), but also by a shared political culture. Concentrating on the values which divided the citizens of the Commonwealth, one should perhaps have devoted more space (if only in the conclusion) to an assessment of the relative role played by common values in the process of collective self-definition. After all, the model of the good *szlachta* citizen did not differ markedly in the case of Catholics, Orthodox, or Protestants. Seventeenth-century Orthodox and Catholic schools had very similar programs, so that pedagogical ideals did not divide but rather united an educated multinational polity.

Naturally, to fulfill these desires or to make fuller use of manuscript sources would have delayed the appearance of this book by several years. The result, moreover, would have been a completely different work. The one we have offers a clearly expressed thesis based on solid source material. All criticism aside, it represents a major step forward in the historiography toward a better understanding not only of the history of Poland and of the Ukraine, but also of that state whose further existence was curtailed by its failure to build a “Commonwealth of Three Nations” based on the Crown, Lithuania, and Ruthenia.